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The Post-Sheinbein Israeli Extradition
Law: Has it Solved the Extradition
Problems Between Israel and the
United States or Has it Merely Shifted
the Battleground?
Abraham Abramovsky*
JonathanI. Edelstein**
ABSTRACT

In this Article, the Authors examine Israel's stance on
extradition. In Part II, the Article offers an historical timeline
of the development of Israel's extraditionpolicies, from common
law to reciprocity. In Part III, the Article examines Israel's
initial attempts to address the problems inherent in its
operating extradition policy. This section also includes an
analysis of the reform movement's effect on specific cases. In
Part IV, the Article examines the most recent reform of Israel's
extraditionpolicy.
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members of the usenet newsgroup soc.history.what-if for making me aware of the
academic potential of counterfactual history such as the Manning hypothetical
contained in Part IV.B.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 1999, the Israeli parliament enacted the Extradition
Act (Amendment No. 6), which, for the first time since 1978,
permitted the extradition of Israeli nationals who had committed
crimes abroad.1 From independence in 1948 until 1978, Israel had
followed the common-law tradition, inherited from the British
Mandatory authorities, of extraditing its own citizens.2 In 1978,
under new political leadership and in the wake of a succession of
high-profile cases, Israel amended its extradition statute by adopting
the Continental system, declaring that it would no longer extradite
3
its nationals.
4
This policy existed in Israel without major difficulty until 1997.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, Israeli officials, concerned that

1.
2.
3.
4.

See
See
See
See

Extradition Act (Amendment No. 6) (1999).
infra notes 31-64 and accompanying text.
infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
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Israel's extradition policy rendered it a haven for Jewish criminals,
began to study proposals for full or partial return to the pre-1978
system. 5 In September 1997, this reform process gained impetus
with the flight of teenage murderer Samuel Sheinbein from Maryland
6
to Israel.
The disconcerting aspects of the Sheinbein case stemmed from
the fact that Sheinbein was born in the United States and, prior to
being accused of the gruesome murder of Enrique Tello, Jr., had
never lived in Israel. 7 He, however, was able to claim that because
his father was an Israeli citizen, he was a national of Israel pursuant
to the Nationality Law of 1952 and that his extradition was thus
precluded by the 1978 statute. 8 This placed the Israeli government in
the position of being forced-against its will and against the interests
of its closest ally, the United States-to prosecute in the Israeli courts
a fugitive who had no prior connection whatsoever with Israel. In
addition, the case became a political and diplomatic debacle for Israel,
straining U.S.-Israeli relations to the point where leading members of
the U.S. Congress threatened to cut off aid. 9
The damage that the Sheinbein case caused to U.S.-Israeli
relations, combined with Israel's anger at the cynical manner in
which Sheinbein manipulated its legal system, led to the repeal of the
1978 extradition legislation. On September 2, 1999, Sheinbein pled
guilty in the Jerusalem District Court to Tello's murder, putting an
end to the two-year battle over his extradition between Israel and the
United States.' 0 By then, however, the case had also put an end to
Israel's twenty-year experiment with nonextradition of its nationals.
Rather than returning to the pre-1978 system, however, the new
legislation divided Israeli citizens for the first time into two
categories." Israeli nationals who are residents of Israel at the time
an extradition request is made may now be extradited, but only on
condition that they be returned to Israel to serve any prison sentence
that may be imposed if convicted by the courts of the requesting
state.12 Those who are not residents at the time of the extradition
request may be extradited regardless of whether the requesting state

5.
See infra notes 163-234 and accompanying text.
6.
For a complete discussion of the facts of the Sheinbein case up to and
including the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, see generally Abraham
Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, The Sheinbein Case and the Israeli-American
Extradition Experience: A Need for Compromise, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 30911, 315-21 (1999).
7.
Id. at 317.
8.
Id. at 317-18.
9.
Id. at 316.
10.
See Ramit Plushnick & Katherine Shaver, Sheinbein's Guilty Plea Doesn't
End Dissension, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1999, at B1.
11.
See Extradition Act Amendment, § 1(A)(1).
12.
Id.
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agrees in advance to allow them to serve their sentences in Israel and
would thus ordinarily be incarcerated in the prisons of the requesting
state.13
The 1999 law represents the latest chapter in Israel's continuing
effort to balance its historic role as a sanctuary for persecuted Jews
with its obligation as a sovereign state to assist other nations in
combating crime. Like Israel's previous attempts to achieve this
balance, however, the most recent amendment to the Extradition Act
may not constitute the desired solution. Because the significant date
for determining Israeli citizenship and residency is the date of the
extradition request rather than the date the offense was committed,
the possibility remains that a fugitive might seek the protection of
Israeli law by fleeing to Israel and attempting to remain there long
14
enough to qualify as a resident.
Moreover, due to differences in sentencing policy between Israel
and other nations, especially the United States, future manipulation
of the amended Israeli extradition law is not only possible but
likely. 15 It may well be that only the battleground has shifted; while
Israeli nationality is no longer a bar to extradition, the issue of Israeli
residency can still be used by fugitives to gain advantage and disrupt
the extradition process. Thus, despite the confident assertion of
Israeli diplomat Lenny Ben-David that there would be "no more
Sheinbeins,"'16 it is likely that Israel will find itself with more
unwanted and politically damaging guests.
Accordingly, this Article will trace the history of extradition in
Israel, analyze the interpretation of the 1999 amendments to the
Israeli Extradition Act, and suggest further revisions. Part II will
discuss extradition in Israel from the Mandate of Palestine through
the Sheinbein case, including both the legislation and the cases and
principles that shaped the various amendments to the law. Part III
will examine the movement for reform that arose prior to and during
the Sheinbein case, the substance of the 1999 legislation, and its
interpretation by the Israeli courts. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
reasons why the current Israeli extradition statute remains subject to
abuse by fugitives and suggest possible amendments that will move
Israeli law closer to the balance it has sought. While cases involving
extradition disputes between Israel and other countries will be
discussed, the primary focus of this Article will be the extradition
relationship between Israel and the United States.

13.
Id.
14.
See infra notes 383-90 and accompanying text.
15.
See infra notes 444-52 and accompanying text.
16.
Lenny Ben-David, Editorial, For Israel, No More Sheinbeins, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23. 1999. at A16.
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II. FROM HERZL TO SHEINBEIN: EXTRADITION AND THE ZIONIST IDEAL
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly
issued Resolution 181, calling for the partition of the British Mandate
of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.17 Six months later, on May
14, 1948, British forces withdrew from Palestine, and the Provisional
Government of the State of Israel declared independence. 18 On the
same day, the new nation, which was already embroiled in military
clashes with Palestinian Arab irregulars, was invaded by the forces of
five Arab nations.1 9 The ensuing war lasted slightly more than a
year, ending with the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement with Syria
on July 20, 1949.20
A. 1896-1975: Zionist Honor and the Common Law
The Israeli victory in the War of Independence resulted in the
formation of the first Jewish state in modern times and the
culmination of the Zionist movement first articulated by Theodor
Herzl half-a-century before. 21 One of the first acts of the State of
Israel after securing its immediate independence was to give
expression to another of the founding Zionist ideals by enacting the
Law of Return. 22 This statute, enacted in 1950, allows any Jew to
immigrate to Israel and immediately obtain Israeli citizenship,
without the necessity of obtaining permission either before or after
As originally enacted, it prohibited the
settling in Israel. 23
government of Israel from limiting the total volume of immigration
and allowed the preclusion of individual immigrants only if they were
"engaged in an activity against the Jewish people" or presented a
threat to public health. 24 As one noted Israeli academic has stated,
the Law of Return

See G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 322, U.N. Doc.
17.
A/364 (1947).

See David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire
18.
Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 836
(1996).
19.
Id. at 834 (discussing the April 1948 agreement among Israel's neighbors to
invade Mandatory Palestine upon the withdrawal of British forces).
Id. at 836. See id. at 839-46 for a discussion of the cease-fire negotiations
20.
during the Israeli War of Independence.
See generally THEODOR HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE (1896) (discussing the
21.
restoration of the Jewish State).
Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114 (1950).
22.

Id. See also Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenshipand Membership
23.
in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 240 (1999) (stating that the Law of
Return encompasses an 'open door' policy toward Jewish immigrants and is viewed as
one of the country's founding principles").
24.
Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114 § 2(b) (1950).
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views every Jew and his or her family members as in potentia citizens
of the State of Israel, thus establishing a formal, legal link between the
State of Israel and the community of world Jewry, and expressing a
fundamental Zionist value upon which the State itself is founded: that
25
Israel should provide a home to any Jew who so desires.

One of the corollaries of this policy of unrestricted immigration
was that Israel "established a policy, since consistently followed, of
aiming at the conclusion of extradition agreements with as many
States as possible. '26 This was done both out of recognition of the
''growing interdependence of States" and out of awareness that a
country which was a haven for Jews might also become a haven for
Jewish criminals. 27 If such criminals were allowed to obtain
sanctuary in Israel, both the international relations of the Israeli
government and the maintenance of domestic law and order would be
28
prejudiced.
In fact, more than half-a-century before the creation of Israel,
the founding philosopher of the Zionist movement argued that
29
extradition was a matter of honor for any Zionist state.

In

his

seminal 1896 work, The Jewish State, Theodor Herzl wrote:
Every just private claim originating in the [requesting] countries will
be heard more readily in the Jewish State than anywhere else. We
shall not wait for reciprocity; we shall act purely for the sake of our own
honor ... we shall deliver up Jewish criminals more readily than any
other State would do, till the time comes when we can enforce our penal
30
code on the same principles as every other civilized nation does.

Thus, although Israel did not adopt a domestic extradition
statute until 1954, the post-independence government continued to
apply the 1926 Extradition Ordinance promulgated by the British
Pursuant to the 1926 statute, Israel
Mandatory authorities.3 1

25.
Shachar, supra note 23, at 234. See also id. at 240 (describing the Law of
Return as "a statutory expression of the Zionist perception of independent statehood").
26.
Theodor Meron, Israel and the EuropeanExtradition System, 5 ISR. L. REV.
75 (1970).
27.
Id. at 76.
28.
Id. See also Joshua Schuster, Paris Jews Worry About Image After Some
are Accused in Scandal, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at 4 (describing French
television documentary entitled "Israel-A Criminal's Paradise").
29.
HERZL, supra note 21, at 102.
30.
Id.
31.
Extradition Ordinance, No. 44 of 1926, 1926 Palestine Ordinances 211
(Dec. 1, 1926), reprinted at 1 Laws of Palestine 677-92 (1934). See also Meron, supra
note 26, at 76 (discussing continuation in force of the Palestine extradition act); Peter
Elman, The Retroactivity of the US.-Israel Extradition Treaty, 1 ISR. L. REV. 356, 361
(1966) (stating that "since the Extradition Ordinance 1926 this country has had an
The 1926 Ordinance in fact replaced an earlier Extradition
extradition law").
Ordinance of 1924, which was equivalent in all material respects with the exception of
See
certain technical provisions regarding the applicability of British treaties.
Extradition Ordinance, No. 18 of 1924, promulgated in Palestine Gazette No. 115 (Jun.
15, 1924). The provisions of the Extradition Ordinance largely conformed to traditional
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concluded provisional agreements in the form of exchange of notes
with France in 1951 and with Belgium in 1953.32 ,These agreements
were governed by the terms of the pre-existing extradition treaties
33
between these countries and the United Kingdom.
In 1954, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, replaced the British
ordinance with domestic legislation to ensure that Israel would not
become a haven for Jewish criminals. 34 First, the Law of Return was
amended to provide that the Minister of the Interior could refuse
permission to immigrate to Israel if he was satisfied that "the
applicant had a criminal past likely to endanger public welfare. '35

common law practice, containing requirements of dual criminality, specialty, and
presentation of a prima facie case as preconditions for extradition and providing that
political offenses were not extraditable. See Extradition Ordinance 1926, supra, at
§§ 2(b), 7(a)-(b), 10(1)(a)-(b), 12(1), 1926 Palestine Ordinances at 211-15. But see Abu
Dourrah v. Attorney General, 8 L. Rep. Pal. 43, 44-45 (Pal. S. Ct. 1941) (holding that
murder could never be a political offense). It should be noted that the Ordinance
applied only to countries outside the British Commonwealth; rendition between the
Mandate of Palestine and other British possessions was governed by the Fugitive
Offenders Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 69 (Eng.). See Palestine Order in Council § 35(iv)
(Aug. 10, 1922), reprinted at 3 Laws of Palestine at 2578 (making the Fugitive
Offenders Act applicable to Palestine); see also 3 Laws of Palestine at 1727-28 (listing
countries to which the 1926 Ordinance was applicable); Supplement No. 2 to Palestine
Gazette 455 (July 26, 1934) (setting forth extradition agreement with Transjordan
government under authority of the 1926 ordinance). In addition, prior to the 1926
Ordinance, the Mandatory government had concluded two provisional extradition
agreements with the French administration in Syria (including Lebanon) and the
Kingdom of Egypt. See Schedule 2 to the Extradition Ordinance 1926, reprinted at 1
Laws of Palestine 687-91 (giving the full text of the agreements). The agreements
differ significantly from the Ordinance; the agreement with France does not require a
prima facie case and the agreement with Egypt does not require dual criminality. See
Provisional Agreement for Extradition of Offenders between Syria and Palestine, art.
10, 1 Laws of Palestine at 688 (July 11, 1921) (requiring only that "the charge [be]
sufficiently made out" to satisfy the examining magistrate); Provisional Agreement
Between the Governments of Egypt and Palestine with Regard to the Extradition of
Offenders, art. 2(a), 1 Laws of Palestine at 689 (Oct. 1, 1922) (calling for rendition of all
persons against whom a warrant has been issued in the requesting state without
regard to dual criminality). Unlike the Extradition Ordinance, these agreements
lapsed upon the creation of the State of Israel, as Israel did not inherit the Mandate's
international obligations. See Meron, supra note 26, at 76; see also infra notes 39-42
and accompanying text. For additional discussion of the Palestine-Syria interim
agreement as it pertained to extradition of nationals, see infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
32.
Yehuda Z. Blum, On the "Retroactivity" of the Israel-U.S. Extradition
Treaty, 1 ISR. L. REV. 362, 365 n.17 (1966). The provisional agreements operated for
periods of one year and were renewed at the conclusion of each period pending the
conclusion of a formal extradition treaty. Id. at 365.
Id. at 365. The Anglo-French extradition treaty dated from 1876 and the
33.
Anglo-Belgian treaty from 1901. Id.
See Meron, supra note 26, at 76-77.
34.
35.
Id. at 77 (citing Law of Return (Amendment) 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144, § 2 (1954)).
This limitation on the immigration of criminals was arguably against Herzl's
conception of the Zionist state, which provided that reformed Jewish criminals should
be permitted to enter. HERZL, supra note 21, at 102 (stating that "we shall receive our
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This discretion, which was exercised most notably in the case of
organized crime figure Meyer Lansky, 36 was broad enough to include
"substantial criminal records" even in the absence of prior
37
convictions.
On the same day, the Knesset also adopted Israel's first domestic
extradition statute. 38 In most respects, this statute was modeled
upon the pre-existing British Mandatory law.3 9 Indeed, it specifically
provided that requests previously made under the 1926 ordinance
would be honored, although repealing the ordinance itself, except for
provisions concerning the taking of evidence on behalf of foreign
governments. 40 In addition, the Extradition Act formally declared
that the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881, 4 1 which was previously
applicable in Palestine, no longer permitted rendition of suspects to
Commonwealth countries outside the extradition process. 42 This
declaration was arguably unnecessary given Israel's position that 4it3
did not inherit the international obligations of Mandatory Palestine,

criminals only after they have suffered due penalties .. .[b]ut having made amends,
they will be received without any restrictions whatever, for our criminals also must
enter upon a new life").
36.
See Herb Keinon, Fit to be Tried: But Where?, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17,
1997, at 11.
37.
Meron, supra note 26, at 77.
38.
Extradition Act, 1954, 8 L.S.I. 144 (1954).
39.
See Meron, supranote 26, at 76-77.
40.
Extradition Act, § 25(a), 8 L.S.I. at 148. The sections of the Ordinance
retained by the 1954 statute provided that Israeli magistrates could subpoena
witnesses and take evidence on behalf of foreign countries to be used in criminal
matters pending in the requesting state. See Extradition Ordinance 1926, supra note
31, §§ 21-22, 1926 Palestine Ordinances, at 218.
41.
44 & 45 Vict. c.69 (Eng.), reprinted at 3 Laws of Palestine 2532-47. Section
2 of this Act provided that "[wihere a person accused of having committed an offence
.I. in one part of Her Majesty's dominions has left that part, such person ... if found

in another part of Her Majesty's dominions, shall be liable to be apprehended and
returned in the manner provided by this Act to the part from which he is a fugitive."
Id. § 2, 3 Laws of Palestine at 2534. The Fugitive Offenders Act was made applicable
to Palestine by Section 35(iv) of the Palestine Order in Council of August 10, 1922,
reprinted at 3 Laws of Palestine 2578.
42.
Extradition Act, § 25(b), 8 L.S.I. at 148.
43.
See Meron, supra note 26, at 76. This position was contrary to that of
certain other countries including Britain, which maintained that a post-colonial
government was bound by agreements negotiated during the colonial period unless it
specifically abrogated those agreements after independence. See Shehadeh v. Comm'r
of Prisons, 14 L. Rep. Pal. 461, 462-63 (Pal. S. Ct. 1947) (holding that extradition
agreement between French Mandatory authorities in Syria and Lebanon remained in
force between the Lebanese Republic and Palestine); see also Perlin v. Superintendent
of Prisons, 9 L. Rep. Pal. 683, 684-85 (Pal. S. Ct. 1942) (noting that "it seems to be
settled practice in International Law that treaties and international agreements are
not affected by a change in government or in the form of government, of one of the
contracting parties and remain in force until denounced by the new government").
Thus, in the absence of the explicit declaration contained in the 1954 statute, British
authorities might have argued that Israel was still bound by the terms of the Fugitive
Offenders Act.
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44
but was included "[f]or the removal of doubt.
In accordance with the English common-law tradition upon
which it was based, the 1954 statute was silent as to the extradition
of Israeli nationals. 45 It conditioned extradition on the existence of
an agreement providing for reciprocity between Israel and the
47
46
requesting state, contained a provision against double jeopardy,
and required that sufficient evidence be presented to justify a trial in
Israel if the crime had been committed there. 48 In addition, the
statute contained a "rule of specialty"-a provision specifying that the
requesting state could only prosecute the fugitive for the offense for
which his extradition was sought. 49 The 1954 law, like the ordinance
of 1926, required dual criminality-that the offense for which
extradition was sought be a crime under both the laws of Israel and
those of the requesting state.,5 0 Each of these requirements adhered
to long-standing common-law principles of extradition.
The Extradition Act of 1954, however, also contained significant
departures from the previous ordinance. In accordance with
developing international norms, the statute provided that extradition
would not be granted in capital cases unless the requesting state
51
agreed in advance not to seek or impose the death penalty.

Extradition Act, § 25(b), 8 L.S.I. at 148.
44.
45.
See S.Z. Feller, The Scope of Reciprocity in Extradition, 10 ISR. L. REV. 427,
433 (1975) (stating that, due to the failure of the 1954 statute to address the
extradition of Israeli nationals, "a restriction on the non-extradition of nationals in an
international agreement does not give rise to, or vest directly, any rights in the
individual [citizen of] Israel").
See Extradition Act, § 2(1), 8 L.S.I. at 144. The statute also made clear that
46.
a fugitive who had fled after being convicted abroad, as opposed to before trial, could
also be extradited if he had not served his full sentence. See id. This precluded
anomalies such as that in El-Kharraz v. Attorney General, 7 L. Rep. Pal. 162, 163 (Pal.
S. Ct. 1940), in which the Supreme Court of the Mandate of Palestine denied a
Jordanian extradition warrant on the ground that the fugitive had already been
convicted and was therefore not a "person charged" pursuant to the Palestine-Jordan
extradition agreement.
Id. § 8, 8 L.S.I. at 145. Specifically, a fugitive in Israel could defeat
47.
extradition if he had been "tried in Israel for the criminal act for which extradition is
requested and has been acquitted or convicted," or if he had been convicted and served
his sentence abroad. Id.
See id. § 9, 8 L.S.I. at 145.
48.
Id. § 17, 8 L.S.I. at 146.
49.
Id. § 2(2), 8 L.S.I. at 144. The Extradition Act of 1954 differed from the
50.
1926 Ordinance, however, in that it did not limit extraditable offenses to a specified list
of crimes but rather allowed extradition for any offense punishable by at least three
years imprisonment under the law of Israel and the requesting state. See id. Schedule
2, 8 L.S.I. at 148; see also Da'na v. Superintendent of Prisons, 3 L. Rep. Pal. 157, 158
(Pal. S. Ct. 1936) (refusing Egyptian extradition request under 1926 ordinance on the
ground that sodomy was not specifically listed as an extraditable offense).
See Extradition Act, § 16, 8 L.S.I. at 146. This provision of Israeli
51.
extradition law, like those involving extradition of nationals, has led to friction
between Israel and the United States, which is the Western industrial nation that
makes the most use of the death penalty. See also Lisa Van Proyen, Murder Suspects

10
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Extradition would also be denied under the 1954 law if the statute of
limitations for the offense had lapsed either under the laws of the
requesting state or those of Israel. 52 The Extradition Act also
included a political offense exception similar to that contained in the
53
1926 statute, with an additional exception for military offenses.
Finally, in a provision "reflect[ing] the sensitivity of Jews as a
persecuted people," 54 the statute permitted courts to refuse
extradition upon a finding of reasonable grounds for assuming that
the accusation arose from racial or religious discrimination. 55
The extraditability of Israeli nationals occasioned little
controversy or comment during the early years of the state. In an
effort to achieve reciprocity, Israeli extradition treaties during that
period conformed to the practices of the requesting states with
respect to extradition of nationals. 56 In this, Israel continued the
policy that had been exercised by British authorities during the
Mandatory period. For example, a 1921 agreement between the
British Mandate government and the French administration in Syria,
consistent with French practice, reserved the right of each party to
refuse to extradite French subjects to Palestine or British subjects to
Syria. 5 7 In contrast, the 1922 agreement between the Mandatory

Face Trial in Israel; Death Penalty Foils Extradition, DAILY NEWS OF Los ANGELES,
May 17, 2000, at 3 (stating that Hanan Nathan and Ben Cohen would likely be tried in
Israel for the Los Angeles murder of rival gang member Alon Giladi because Israel
would not extradite them to face the death penalty); see also Margot Dudkevitch, Two
Israelis Suspected inLos Angeles Murder,JERUSALEM POST, May 18, 2000, at 4 (stating
that Israeli police recommended the indictment of Hanan Nathan and Ben Cohen in
Israel).
52.
See id. § 8(2), 8 L.S.I. at 145.
53.
See id. § 2(2), 8 L.S.I. at 144 (specifying that an offense of a political
character was not an extraditable crime); id. § 10(b), 8 L.S.I. at 145 (stating that a
court shall not declare a wanted person subject to extradition if "the request for
extradition aims at prosecuting or punishing him for an offense of a political character,
though prima facie it is not made in connection with such an offense"); id. Schedule
2(a)(1), 8 L.S.I. at 148 (stating that an offense was not extraditable if it was "an offense
with which a person can only be charged if at the time of committing it he [was] a
soldier within the meaning of the Army Code").
54.
Meron, supra note 26, at 81.
55.
Extradition Act, § 10, 8 L.S.I. at 145.
56.
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
57.
See Provisional Agreement for Extradition of Offenders between Syria and
Palestine, July 11, 1921, art. 5, 1 Laws of Palestine at 688. The terms "British subject"
and "French subject" were undefined in the agreement, but apparently did not include
Syrians, Lebanese, or Palestinians as these were consistently mentioned separately
from British or French subjects. See, e.g., id. art. 7, 1 Laws of Palestine at 688
(referring to requests for "a French subject, a Syrian or a Lebanese" and for "a British
subject or a Palestinian"); see also id. art. 14, 1 Laws of Palestine at 689 (defining the
"Syrians" to include "subjects of the State of Syria, the Government of Lattaquieh, and
the Jebel Druze"). Accordingly, the agreement's provisions for nonextradition of
nationals apparently protected only French and British personnel present in the
Mandatory territories rather than the indigenous inhabitants. See, e.g., Perlin v.
Superintendent of Prisons, 9 L. Rep. Pal. 683, 684 (Pal. S. Ct. 1942) (extraditing a
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of Egypt made no provision for
authorities and the Kingdom
58
nonextradition of nationals.
The same pattern was followed by the post-independence
Israel's bilateral treaties with France,
government of Israel.
South Africa, for instance, specifically
and
Belgium,
Luxembourg,
or allowed the requested state to
of
nationals
extradition
forbade the
its
nationals was sought. 59 The
of
one
refuse extradition where
60
European Convention on Extradition, to which Israel was one of the
original parties in 1957, likewise permitted parties to refuse the
61
The
extradition of nationals in accordance with domestic law.
the
and
Israel
between
bilateral extradition treaties concluded
and
Canada,
common-law countries of the United Kingdom,
Swaziland, on the other hand, were silent as to the extradition of
nationals. 62 In fact, the extradition treaty concluded in 1962 between
Israel and the United States, unique among Israel's bilateral
extradition treaties, specifically provided that neither party could
refuse extradition solely on the ground that the fugitive was a
63
national of the requested state.
Ironically, the first significant protest against extradition of
Israeli nationals occurred in the same year. This protest arose from
the case of Robert Soblen, a U.S. Jew who fled to Israel after being
convicted of espionage. 64 After an extradition request was made by
the United States pursuant to the newly ratified treaty, Soblen was
arrested and placed on a flight for the United States. 65 During the
flight, Soblen slashed his wrists. 66 Although this suicide attempt was
unsuccessful, he subsequently succeeded in killing 6 7himself by
ingesting poison while under guard at a London hospital.

Palestinian Jew to Lebanon under the terms of the agreement). But see El Zahir v.
Acting British Magistrate, Haifa, 13 L. Rep. Pal. 120, 127-28 (Pal. S. Ct. 1946) (opinion
of DeComarmond, J.) (noting that the extradition treaty differentiated between the
terms "English" and "British" and that a person "of Arab or African origin" might be a
British subject).
See Provisional Agreement between the Governments of Egypt and
58.
Palestine with Regard to the Extradition of Offenders, Dec. 1, 1922, 1 Laws of
Palestine 689-91.
See Feller, supranote 45, at 428-30.
59.
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 359 U.N.T.S. 273
60.
[hereinafter European Convention].
See Feller, supra note 45, at 430 (citing European Convention, supra note
61.
61, art. 6).
Id. at 427.
62.
See Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the United
63.
States of America and the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr. 14
U.S.T. 1707, corr. version in 18 U.S.T. 382 (1967).
64.
Ann LoLordo, To Extradite or Not to Extradite?, BALT. SUN, Oct. 23, 1997,
at 2A.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
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The death of Soblen struck a chord with many Israelis, including
then-opposition leader Menachem Begin.6 8 In an impassioned article
written in the newspaper of the Likud Party, Begin expressed the
opinion that no Jew should ever be extradited from Israel. 69 Begin
quoted from Deuteronomy 23:15: "You shall not give up to his master
a slave who has escaped from his master to you." 70 In contrast to
Herzl's promise that a Zionist state would readily extradite Jewish
criminals, Begin "considered it the role of the Jewish state to give
'71
asylum to wanted Jews."
Begin's position, although new to Israel, was grounded in the
long-standing practice of civil law countries. 72 The protection of
nationals from extradition had its roots in the feudal loyalties of
73
medieval times and had been the practice of France since the 1830s.
By the end of the nineteenth century, a clear pattern had developed,
with the majority of Continental states refusing to extradite their
74
nationals and the common-law countries allowing such extradition.
During the twentieth century, the practice of nonextradition of
nationals spread to Latin America and was enshrined in the South
American Bustamante Code agreement of 1928 and the Central
American Extradition Convention of 1934. 75
The Arab League
extradition agreement of 1952 also contained a discretionary
provision allowing parties to refuse to extradite their nationals. 76 By
the 1970s, S.Z. Feller, one of the leading Israeli authorities on
extradition, was able to describe nonextradition of nationals as an
"international norm" and conclude that 155 of 163 extradition
agreements published in the League of Nations Treaty Series
77
contained at least some restriction on the extradition of nationals.
The arguments that would influence the debate over whether
Israeli nationals should be extradited had first been framed in 1878
by the British Royal Commission on Extradition.7 8 In its report to
Parliament, the Commission stated that:
In favour of such a provision it is said that a man should not be drawn
from his natural judges; that the State owes to its subjects the

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.

Id. (quoting former Israeli cabinet member Arye Naor).
Id.
Michael Plachta, (Non.)Extraditionof Nationals:A Never-Ending Story, 13

EMORY INT'L L. REV. 77, 83 (1999).

74.
Id. at 83-84.
75.
Feller, supra note 45, at 448.
76.
Id. (citing SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 220 (1968)).
77.
Feller, supra note 45, at 452.
78.
Theodor Meron, Non-Extradition of Israeli Nationals and Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction:Reflections on Bill No. 1306, 13 ISR. L. REV. 215, 215-16 (1978).
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protection of its laws, and that it fails in this duty if it hands over any
of them to a foreign jurisdiction ... that it is impossible to place entire
confidence in the justice of a foreign State . . . and that it is a serious
disadvantage to a man to be tried in a foreign language, and where he
is separated from his friends and his resources...79

The Commission concomitantly presented the countervailing
arguments in favor of extradition of nationals. 80 Among these were
that "[t]he offence is an offence against the law of the country in
which it is alleged to have been committed ...[w]hy, because he has
escaped beyond the jurisdiction of that law, should an offender ... be
in a different position from that in which he would have been in the
81
country from which he has escaped?"
Some fifty-seven years later, a 1935 Harvard University study of
extradition revisited the issue and strongly supported the principle of
extradition of nationals.8 2 The Harvard panel rejected the argument
that a fugitive's compatriots are his "natural judges," concluding
instead that the natural judges of an accused are those of the state
where the crime was committed. 83 In addition, the panel noted that if
a nation distrusted the justice system of another country, it should
refuse extradition to that state altogether rather than exempting its
own nationals. 84 The Harvard report proposed a model convention on
extradition providing that "a requested State shall not decline to
extradite a person claimed because such person is a national of the
requested State."85 In light of the fact that many nations were
traditionally reluctant to extradite their citizens, however, the draft
convention included an alternative provision allowing a requested
86
state to try the fugitive in its own courts in lieu of extradition.

79.
Id. at 216 (quoting REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON EXTRADITION,
1879, C. 2039 at 6, 24) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
80.
Meron, supra note 78, at 216.
81.
Id. (quoting COMMISSION REPORT).
82.
Meron, supra note 78, at 216 (citing Draft Convention on Extradition, (with
comment) 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 127-29 (Supp. 1935)) [hereinafter HarvardResearch].
83.
HarvardResearch, supra note 82, at 128.
84.
Id. at 128. This argument was echoed by James Leslie Brierly in his 1926
report to the League of Nations Committee for the Progressive Codification of
International Law, in which he stated that distrust of a foreign judicial system "would
seem to be a reason which would justify the refusal of extradition to that State
altogether, but could not justify the practice of differentiating between nationals and
other persons." James Leslie Brierly, Report on Extradition, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 244
(Supp. 1926). In addition, Professor Charles DeVisscher, in a presentation to the same
committee, argued that "authorities of a country where an offence has been committed
are best qualified to punish it and in that respect they possess a natural jurisdiction."
Meron, supra note 78, at 217 (discussing Brierly's and DeVisscher's views).
85.
HarvardResearch, supra note 82, at 123.
86.
Feller, supra note 45, at 448 (discussing the Harvard Draft Convention).
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B. 1975-1997.Reciprocity and Sanctuary
Despite the Soblen affair and Begin's heartfelt pronouncements,
the debate concerning the extradition of nationals remained a largely
academic one in Israel until the late 1970s. In 1975, a private bill
was introduced by nine members of Knesset providing that an Israeli
national "shall not be extradited unless his extradition is requested
for an offense committed prior to his becoming an Israeli national,"
but the Knesset did not enact this bill into law.8 7 In the same year,
however, noted Israeli academic S.Z. Feller expressed the view that
Israel should conform to the Continental framework and decline to
extradite its nationals.8 8 Professor Feller based this conclusion on
two factors: the requirement of reciprocity contained in Israeli
domestic extradition law and the fact that extradition from Israel
could not be granted in the absence of a treaty.8 9
The requirement of reciprocity, according to Feller, had the
potential of leading to practical difficulties in extraditing Israelis to
European nations that refused to extradite their own nationals. 90 He
illustrated this by giving the example of an Israeli national who,
"having committed an extraditable offence in Switzerland, eventually
finds his way back to Israel."91 Because Swiss law at that time
absolutely forbade the extradition of Swiss nationals, 92 Professor
Feller noted that the reciprocity provision in section 2(A) of the 1954
Extradition Act could bar the extradition of the Israeli national to
Switzerland. 93 While Feller argued in favor of an interpretation of
reciprocity under which Switzerland could meet its obligation by
prosecuting its own nationals rather than extraditing them, he noted
that the Israeli courts might not agree. 94 If the Israeli courts were to

87.
Id. at 454 n.52.
88.
Id. at 452-55.
89.
Id. at 438-54.
90.
Id. at 439-40.
91.
Id. at 438.
92.
Id. at 438 n.16 (citing Extradition Law art. 2 (Switz. 1892)). The Swiss law
in effect in 1975 provided that Swiss nationals would not be extradited but would
instead be tried by the courts of Switzerland, provided that the offenses of which they
were accused were crimes in Switzerland. Id. Swiss law has since been amended to
permit the extradition of nationals, but only upon their written consent. Plachta,
supranote 73, at 84.
93.
Feller, supra note 45, at 439-40.
94.
Id. at 445-46. Feller states that
where Switzerland does not extradite because of Swiss nationality and for that
reason at the request of Israel as the requesting state extra-territorial
jurisdiction arises in Switzerland, then the reciprocity rule will oblige Israel to
extradite to Switzerland an Israeli national when an Israeli court lacks extraterritorial jurisdiction even in consequence of a request by Switzerland.
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disagree with Feller and interpret reciprocity in a way that required
exactly identical treatment of citizens, then Israel would be unable to
extradite its nationals to most European or Latin American
95
countries.
As importantly, Professor Feller noted that, at the time of his
writing, Israel maintained extradition treaties with only twenty-one
countries and that Israeli domestic law did not permit extradition in
the absence of a treaty. 96 Moreover, with a narrow exception directed
primarily at international terrorism, Israeli courts lacked jurisdiction
over offenses committed outside the borders of Israel. 97 Hence, if an

Id.; id. at 448 (arguing that reciprocity could be satisfied by "one obligation set against
another, one exemption against another, each according to the values, concepts and
perceptions of the state involved"). Feller based this conclusion on his view that
"reciprocity [can] be fully satisfied by substantive and global equivalence ... in order to
make possible the prosecution or punishment of an offender when the other conditions
for extradition are present," but noted the opposing view under which "formal
symmetry and complete identity [were] necessary in every detail between the
conditions under which the two states are required to extradite or are prevented from
extraditing ....
Id. at 445. Feller also stated:
The extradition law of Israel ... requires both policy and normative reciprocity
and therefore it is perfectly legitimate for the court to deal with the question of
whether the system of norms upon which the petition is founded does in fact
ensure reciprocity, including inter alia the matter of the extradition of
nationals.
Id. at 451. In addition, Feller noted that where a treaty did not make nonextradition of
nationals conditional upon prosecution in the requested state, reciprocity did not exist
because no mutuality of obligations existed. Id. at 453 n.48.
95.
Id. at 446-48.
96.
Id. at 452-53.
97.
Id. at 453. The exception to the Israeli rule against extraterritorial
jurisdiction was created by the Penal Law (Offences Committed Abroad) Act, 28 L.S.I.
32 (Isr. 1973). Section 2(a) of this act provided that:
[T]he courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law a person who
committed an act abroad which would have been an offence had it been
committed in Israel, and which harmed or was intended to harm the State of
Israel, its security, property or economy or its transport or communication links
with other countries.
Id. § 2(a), 28 L.S.I. at 32; see also id. § 4(a), 28 L.S.I. at 34 (granting jurisdiction over
offenses committed abroad which "harmed or were intended to harm the life, person,
health, freedom or property of an Israeli national or resident of Israel"); Meron, supra
note 78, at 219 n.16. This legislation thus represented an adoption of the "passive
personality" principle of jurisdiction, under which a nation may exercise jurisdiction
over an offense committed outside its borders if that state or a national thereof was the
victim or intended victim. Id. at 219 (stating that the 1973 legislation "introduced in a
very wide and comprehensive way the principle of passive personality"). In fact, the
1973 act may represent the broadest exercise of passive personality jurisdiction
adopted by any nation, as it encompasses crimes against certain world Jewish and
Zionist organizations as well as against the State of Israel or its nationals. See Penal
Law (Offences Committed Abroad) Act, Schedule 1, 28 L.S.I. at 35. In addition, section
1 of the 1973 law adopted the theory of universal jurisdiction with respect to crimes of
genocide, piracy, hijacking, and drug trafficking. See id. § 1, 28 L.S.I. at 32. Prior to
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Israeli national committed a crime in a nation with which Israel did
not have an extradition treaty, he would escape punishment
entirely. s 8 As Feller noted:
Israel's extra-territorial jurisdiction

.

.

.

is very narrow and its

normative basis is moreover unsystematic and incoherent. What is
most troubling is that the mass of really serious and relatively frequent
crimes are not caught by this jurisdiction. An Israeli national may
without criminal liability steal, rob, deceive, rape, forge--even
currency, commit arson and destroy property, kill-even with
premeditation, as long as he escapes to Israel; and if there is no
possibility to extradite him, either because of the absence of an
extradition agreement or of reciprocity in the extradition of nationals,
he will be regarded by local law as not having committed any wrong so
long as he remains within the area since it is completely forbidden to
99
prosecute him in order to establish his culpability

This situation "[would cut] off the state [of Israel] with all its legal
00
and moral values from those of its nationals who are abroad."'
Accordingly, Professor Feller advocated that Israel adopt the
"active personality" principle of jurisdiction, under which Israeli
courts would have jurisdiction over all offenses committed by Israeli
nationals in foreign countries.1 0 1 By doing so, Israel would assure
that its citizens would be held responsible for their criminal acts
abroad, even if no extradition treaty existed between Israel and the
country where the crime was committed. 10 2 Yet in the interests of
reciprocity and humanitarianism, Feller "concur[red] with those who
shrink from the extradition of Israeli nationals. ' 10 3 In essence, Feller
advocated a shift in Israeli extradition norms from its Britishinfluenced common-law tradition to the Continental system. In other
words, Feller argued that Israel should "prohibit the extradition of
nationals while extending the extra-territorial jurisdiction of Israeli
10 4
courts to such a national even if his extradition is not requested."
Two years later, in 1977, two high-profile extradition cases
moved Professor Feller's views on extradition of nationals to the
forefront of public debate. The first of these mirrored the example

1978, however, Israeli law generally did not recognize the "active personality"
principle, under which jurisdiction could be based upon the nationality of the offender
as opposed to the victim. See Meron, supra note 78, at 219-20. The 1973 act did adopt
active personality jurisdiction for official corruption and frauds against the state of
Israel, but not for crimes against the person. See Penal Law (Offences Committed
Abroad) Act, § 3(a), 28 L.S.I. at 33.
Feller, supra note 45, at 452-53.
98.
99.
Id. at 453.
100.
Id.
Id. at 453-54. Feller argued that Israeli acceptance of active personality
101.
jurisdiction should extend to "all crimes and misdemeanours," subject to a requirement
of dual criminality. Id. at 453 n.50.
102. Id. at 454.
Id.
103.
104. Id. at 455.
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used by Feller in his article. This event was the case of Reuben
Pesachowitz, an Israeli national who was sought by Switzerland on
charges of fraud. 10 5 In opposition to the Swiss extradition request,
Pesachowitz urged that the preclusion of nationals from extradition
under Swiss law fell short of the reciprocity required by the 1954
Extradition Act and hence barred his own extradition.' 0 6 The
Supreme Court of Israel, however, adopted Feller's conception of the
reciprocity rule, holding that the provision of the European
Convention on Extradition requiring that requested states try their
citizens in lieu of extradition established sufficient mutuality of
obligations between Israel and Switzerland.1 0 7 Despite the court's
ruling, however, Pesachowitz' arguments received broad support both
from the Israeli public and from politicians who shared Begin's
sentiments.' 0 8 His extradition to Switzerland engendered support for
a policy of protecting Israelis from trial in foreign countries.1 0 9
The second case to gain widespread publicity in Israel during
1977 was that of Shmuel Flatto-Sharon, a financier who was wanted
in France on allegations that he had defrauded French citizens of
During the early 1970s,
approximately sixty million dollars. 110
Flatto-Sharon emigrated to Israel."' After France requested his
extradition in 1976, the fugitive millionaire began a concerted effort
to avoid being extradited. 112 In that year, Flatto-Sharon published a
fifty-one page French-language pamphlet, later translated into
English and Hebrew, which depicted him as a Holocaust survivor and
a friend of then-Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir with significant
Although not specifically mentioning
investments in Israel. 113
the need for solidarity between
pamphlet
emphasized
the
extradition,
114
It stressed the need for Israel
diaspora.
Israel and the Jews in the
Jew in the world" and
to
"every
individual
to provide representation
provided
with Israeli passports
advocated that all Jews should be
the
event
of persecution.1 5
whereby they could obtain sanctuary in

See Cr. A. 308/75, Pesachowitz v. State of Israel, 31(2) P.D. 449, 455 (Isr.
105.
1977).
Id. at 456.
106.
107.
Id. at 465. See also Kamiar v. Attorney General, 22(2) P.D. 85, 115 (Isr.
1972) (holding that a formal condition of reciprocity is met by an agreement that
imposes obligations upon both Israel and the other contracting party).
Pardonfrom the Highest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1977, at 83.
108.
109.
Id.
110.
Israel Court Orders Candidate To Begin a Bribery Jail Tern, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1984, at A6.
Id.
111.
112.
Id.
Shmuel Flatto-Sharon, THE INTERNATIONAL OF ISRAELI CITIZENS 7-11
113.
(1976).
114.
See id. at 39-51.
Id. at 39, 43. Flatto-Sharon proposed that these goals be achieved by the
115.
formation of a quasi-governmental "International of Israeli Citizens," whose members
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Flatto-Sharon used this manifesto as a springboard to enter
politics. He campaigned in the 1977 Knesset elections with the
openly stated purpose of avoiding extradition by gaining
parliamentary immunity. 116
Under ordinary circumstances, his
attempt would likely have failed. At the time, however, anti-French
sentiment was high in Israel due to France's refusal to extradite Abu
Daoud, an alleged perpetrator of the September 1972 massacre of
Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich, to Israel or West Germany. 1 17 As
a result, Flatto-Sharon's campaign attracted the support of a number
of prominent Israelis-including Begin, who protested vociferously
against Flatto-Sharon's extradition to France." l8 Although FlattoSharon hardly spoke Hebrew and had to campaign with the aid of an
interpreter, he secured thirty-five thousand votes in the May 1977
election, winning a seat in the Knesset and gaining parliamentary
19
immunity.
The same election brought Begin's Likud Party, which had
hitherto been in the opposition, to power as the leading party in 21
a
center-right coalition. 120 Begin himself became Prime Minister.'
Soon after his election, Begin capitalized on the sentiment generated
by the Pesachowitz and Flatto-Sharon cases to give effect to his longstanding view that Israeli citizens should not be extradited. 122 The
result was the Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of

would obtain Israeli protection in return for financial and political support in their
home countries. See id. at 39-51. Subsequently, Flatto-Sharon in fact founded an
organization called the "World Congress for the Defense of Jews in Distress." 25
Israelis Test Gun Skill to ProtectEurope's Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1980, at A13.
116.
Susan Hattis Rolef, Crooks and Books, JERUSALEM POST, June 16, 1997, at

6.

See also H.D.S. Greenway, One-Man Political Party Wins Two Seats in Israel,

WASH. POST, May 21, 1977, at A8; 27 Parties to Vie for Israel Vote, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., June 3, 1984, at A21 (noting that Flatto-Sharon's election "saved him from
extradition to France"). Flatto-Sharon supplemented his anti-extradition platform by
promising that "as a businessman he would strive to make Israel a more attractive
place to live." Greenway, supra,at A8.

117.

Brandon S. Chabner, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism

Act of 1986: Prescribingand Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorist Violence
Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV. 985, 1004 (1990). The reason given by the French courts
for refusing to extradite Abu Daoud to Israel was that his extradition was being sought
under a passive personality theory of jurisdiction, which was not recognized by French
law. Id. This rationale, however, was inapplicable to West Germany, which had
territorial jurisdiction over Daoud. In addition, Chabner notes that the French
decision "seem[s] particularly inflexible" because the French courts had applied passive
personality jurisdiction on prior occasions to obtain jurisdiction over defendants
accused of crimes against French nationals. Id. at 1004 n.83.
118.
Pardon from the Highest, supra note 108, at 83.
119.
Greenway, supra note 116, at A8. See also Susan Hattis Rolef, Wasted
Votes, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 8, 1996, at 6 (stating that Flatto-Sharon received 35,049
votes).
120.
Pardon from the Highest, supra note 108, at 83.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
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Enactments) Act of 1978, commonly referred to as the Offences
23
Committed Abroad Act.'
This law created an extradition regime for Israel that followed
the proposal set forth by Feller in 1975. On the one hand, the
Extradition Act was amended to provide that no Israeli citizen could
be extradited except for an offense committed before he obtained
citizenship. 1 24
On the other hand, Israeli courts were given
jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli citizens, or noncitizen residents, for
This extraterritorial
offenses committed outside Israel. 125
jurisdiction was subject to a requirement of dual criminality, 126 and
Israeli courts were prohibited from imposing penalties greater than
12 7
could have been imposed in the state where the offense took place.
In addition, the statute made provision for Israel to administer
the sentences of fugitives who fled to Israel after being sentenced by
the courts of another country. 128 As with extraterritorial jurisdiction,
Israel could only enforce a foreign sentence if it were imposed for an
extraditable offense and could not enforce it beyond the maximum
penalty provided by Israeli law for an equivalent crime. 129 The
Offences Committed Abroad Act was introduced in the Knesset on
July 25, 1977 and enacted on January 3, 1978-with Flatto-Sharon,
who was part of the governing coalition, among those voting in
130
favor.

123.
Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Act, 1978, 32
L.S.I. 63 (1978).
124.
Id. § 2, 32 L.S.I. at 64. As originally drafted, the bill precluded the
extradition of Israeli nationals even for offenses committed prior to becoming citizens,
but the bill was amended in committee to allow extradition for such offenses. Meron,
supra note 78, at 215 n.1.
125.
See Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Act, § 1, 32
L.S.I. at 63-64.
126.
Id. § 1(1), 32 L.S.I. at 63.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. § 1(3), 32 L.S.I. at 63-64.
129.
Id. § 1(3), 32 L.S.I. at 64. Enforcement of foreign sentences, however, was
not confined to sentences imposed by countries having extradition treaties with Israel.
See id.
Meron, supra note 78, at 215 n.1. See also Pardon from the Highest, supra
130.
note 108, at 83 (noting that Flatto-Sharon was a member of the governing coalition).
Flatto-Sharon's term in office was characterized by flamboyant gestures including
support for homeless Israeli squatters seeking housing in Jerusalem, negotiation of
prisoner exchanges, and formation of a private defense force for French and Belgian
synagogues after a synagogue bombing in Paris. William Claiborne, Settlers Pitch
Their Tents in Jerusalem, WASH. POST, June 16, 1980, at Al (discussing FlattoSharon's role in financing a tent city for Israeli slum-dwellers); David M. Alpern, A
Three-Way Spy Swap, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1978, at 26 (detailing Flatto-Sharon's
involvement in the exchange of imprisoned spies); 25 Israelis Test Gun Skill to Protect
Europe's Jews, supra note 115, at A13 (discussing recruitment of twenty-five Israeli
combat veterans by Flatto-Sharon to protect European synagogues). Flatto-Sharon,
however, was ultimately convicted of vote-buying in connection with the 1977 election,
sentenced to nine months in prison, and suspended from the Knesset. Israeli
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Although supported by a majority of legislators, the Offences
Committed Abroad Act was not without its detractors. 13 1 Writing
shortly after the passage of the law, Israeli academic Theodor Meron
contended that a Continental extradition regime was logistically
132
impractical and potentially dangerous to Israel's world standing.
Meron noted that "the procedural law [of Israel]-including the law of
evidence-pertaining to criminal cases has remained particularly
well suited to the territorial principle of jurisdiction.' 1 3 3 This
occurrence was due to the fact that Israel, which followed the
adversarial system of common-law criminal jurisprudence rather
than the inquisitorial system common to civil-law countries, required
"the prosecution [to] bring witnesses to give oral evidence in order to
establish every point in its case." 134 Thus, the fact that witnesses and
physical evidence had to be transported to Israel would make it
difficult to conduct a trial in accordance with Israeli due process
standards when an offense was committed abroad. 135 This conflict
left Israel with a Hobson's choice between lowering evidentiary
abroad or foregoing
standards in cases where crimes were committed
136
evidence.
inadequate
to
due
prosecution
Professor Meron also criticized the 1978 statute as providing
protection to "not only nationals of Israel who normally reside in
Israel . . .[but] Israeli nationals who reside in foreign countries and
whose Israeli nationality constitutes merely a formal bond.' 137 This
protection raised the danger of "encourag[ing] attempts to escape
from lawful custody abroad and reach Israel."'1 38 Israel would in fact
be powerless to extradite nationals "even in cases which would cause
the Government embarrassment in its relations with the foreign
States concerned and harm Israel's international reputation."'139 This
argument was especially compelling in the context of U.S.-Israeli

ParliamentSuspends Member Convicted of Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1981, at A7.
See also Greenway, supra note 116, at A8 (noting that switchboards were jammed by
Israeli voters "calling to find out how and where to apply for a bribe" from FlattoSharon). Flatto-Sharon lost bids for re-election in 1981 and 1984, but was never
returned to France to serve his five-year sentence due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. LoLordo, supra note 64, at 2A. See also Israeli Legislator and Financier
Sentenced in Abstentia by France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1979, at 14 (stating that a
French court sentenced Flatto-Sharon in absentia to five years in prison and a fine of
seventy-two hundred dollars).
Meron, supra note 78, at 215-18.
131.
Id. at 220-28.
132.
133.
Id. at 220.
134.
Id. at 220-21 n.17.
135.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Meron also questioned whether there was a sufficient basis in
136.
international law for assuming active personality jurisdiction over persons who were
residents but not citizens of Israel. Id.
Id. at 222.
137.
138.
Id. at 225.
139.
Id. at 222.
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relations, because Israel's extradition treaty with the United States
explicitly committed it to extradite its nationals. 140 Accordingly,
Meron concluded that the 1978 legislation was unnecessary,
particularly in light of the antidiscrimination provisions and the
141
broad discretion granted to Israeli authorities under the 1954 act.
In sum, he contended that the Offences Committed Abroad Act
created "a real danger that . . . Israel would become a haven for
1 42
criminals."'
Despite Professor Meron's criticism, the Offences Committed
Abroad Act was deemed by many to be consistent with Israel's role as
a sanctuary for Jews. 14 3 This sentiment was further reinforced by the
case of William Nakash in 1985.144 Nakash, a French Jew, was
accused of the 1983 murder of an Arab nightclub owner and drug
dealer. 145 Rather than stand trial in France, Nakash fled to Israel
and acquired citizenship, remaining there until the French
146
government submitted an extradition request some two years later.
Although Nakash was extraditable under the 1978 law because he
had committed the murder before he became an Israeli citizen, many
Israeli leaders were reluctant to return him to France due to a
perception that his life would be in danger from Arab gangs in French
Among his supporters was then-Justice Minister
prisons. 14 7
Avraham Sharir, who stated publicly that "[he] would rather be
known as soft-hearted than bear responsibility for sending Nakash to
his death in a French prison.' 148 As a result, Sharir attempted to
exercise his discretion under section 18 of the 1954 Extradition Act to
deny the French request; the Israeli Supreme Court, however, ruled
that he had abused his discretion by acting without sufficient
evidence of danger to Nakash's life. 149 While Nakash was ultimately
extradited, the case further galvanized public opinion in Israel
against the rendition of citizens for trial and imprisonment abroad. 150
Moreover, for two decades after the enactment of the Offences
Committed Abroad Act, the Continental system did not cause serious
difficulties in Israel. In fact, Israeli authorities conducted several

140.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 222-24, 229.
141.
Id. at 229.
142.
143.
Id. at 222.
144.
See Nakash v. State of Israel, 40(4) P.D. 78 (1986).
Id. at 85.
145.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 88. Nakash also argued that the murder of which he had been
convicted was a political offense because it was committed due to the failure of French
authorities to protect Jews from Arab violence, but this argument was rejected by the
Israeli courts. Id. at 90.
148.
Keinon, supranote 36, at 11.
149.
Nakash, 40(4) P.D. at 94.
150.
Keinon, supranote 36, at 11.
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successful prosecutions of Israeli nationals who had fled to Israel
after committing crimes abroad. The first such instance was the 1993
trial of Isaac Kirman, a small-time drug dealer who had fled to Israel
after being indicted in Suffolk County, New York. 15 1 Subsequently,
Yair Orr and Nadav Nakan were convicted in Israel on charges
stemming from a California murder. 152 In addition, Israel Mizrahi
was convicted on U.S. drug trafficking charges, although acquitted of
153
the Brooklyn murder of Israeli gangster Michael Markowitz.
These joint prosecutions, although not without difficulty,
generally went smoothly. Through mutual cooperation, Israeli and
U.S. prosecutors ironed out difficulties resulting from transportation
of witnesses and physical evidence, including the taking of
depositions abroad. 154 In fact, prosecution in Israel offered certain
advantages that were not available in the U.S. criminal justice
system. Unlike U.S. investigators, Israeli police are not required to
"minimize" their invasion of a suspect's privacy through wiretaps and
can listen to entire conversations rather than only the portions
indicating criminal intent. 155 Due to the lack of a jury system and
exclusionary rule in Israel, trials frequently proceed more quickly and
at less cost than if they had been conducted in the United States. 156
Moreover, a defendant's silence can be held against him in an Israeli
157
court, and prosecutors are permitted to appeal verdicts of acquittal.
Accordingly, although prosecutions in Israel presented certain
logistical difficulties, they did not unduly strain U.S.-Israeli law
enforcement relations.
Concomitantly, Israel continued to extradite Israeli citizens who
had committed crimes prior to emigrating to Israel. Among the most
famous examples was the case of "Crazy Eddie" Antar, who was
extradited to the United States by Israeli authorities to face charges
of embezzlement and fraud. 158
In addition, Robert Manning, a
member of the Jewish Defense League who had emigrated to Israel
after killing a secretary at an Arab-American organization in

151.
Mark Cohen, New York v. Kirman/Israel v. Kirman: A Prosecution in Tel
Aviv under Israeli Law for a Narcotics Offense Committed in New York, 4 CRIM. L.F.
597, 604-05 (1993). Cohen, an assistant district attorney in Suffolk County, was the
lead American prosecutor in the Kirman case. Id. at 605.
152.
Abraham Abramovsky, Partners Against Crime: Joint Prosecutions of
Israeli Organized Crime Figures by U.S. and IsraeliAuthorities, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1903, 1914-17 (1996).
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 1912-14.
155.
Id. at 1913.
156.
Id. at 1917 n.65 (citing interview with Kirman prosecutor Mark Cohen).
157.
Id. at 1913-14.
158.
Id. at 1908 n.24.
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California with a letter bomb, was extradited to the United States to
face a sentence of life without parole.' 59
By the early 1990s, however, the Israeli policy on extradition of
nationals was beginning to strain Israel's international relations,
especially with the United States. 160 A key factor in the development
of this tension was the criminalization of money laundering by the
United States in 198616 1-a measure that was not followed by Israel
until 2000.162 This difference meant that the money laundering
statute, which was a key component of U.S. efforts against
international organized crime, could not be enforced in Israel. As a
result, large-scale Israeli money launderers such as Adi Tal were not
only able to escape prosecution in the United States by fleeing to
Israel, but could not be prosecuted under Israeli domestic law due to
63
the lack of dual criminality. 1
In addition, as national borders became more porous both to
human traffic and to money, crime itself became more international
in scope and transnational offenses and investigations became
increasingly common. 164 When Professor Feller argued against
extradition of Israeli nationals in 1975, he was able to assert that
"only in very exceptional circumstances are [foreign] states in fact
interested in having persons extradited to them. '165 To say the least,
this statement was far less applicable twenty years later.
The increasing emphasis on international cooperation in law
enforcement can best be illustrated by the rapid growth in the
number of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) during the last
quarter of the twentieth century. 166 The United States concluded its
first MLAT, with Switzerland, only two years prior to Professor
Feller's article. 167 By the mid-1990s, however, it had concluded
similar treaties with more then twenty-five countries and

159.
Id. For additional discussion of Manning, see infra notes 471-97 and
accompanying text.
160.
See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 332-33.
161.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1986).

162.

Nina

Gilbert,

The Money-Laundering Prohibition Law

Approved,

JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 3, 2000, at 4. Israel's lack of a money laundering statute prior
to 2000 has been widely criticized as facilitating the commission of crimes by expatriate
Israeli nationals because they were able to deposit the proceeds of their crimes safely

in Israel. Israel Rejects French Criticism of Failureto Extradite in Money-Laundering
Case, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 23, 2001 (describing accusations by French authorities that
French Jews with dual Israeli nationality regularly flew to Israel to deposit the
proceeds of bank fraud).
163.
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 333.
164.
Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Time for FinalAction on 18
U.S.C. § 3292, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 946-48 (2000).
165.
Feller, supra note 45, at 452.
166.
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 164, at 947-52.
167.
Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T.2019.
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In addition, U.S. law enforcement agencies
dependencies. 168
increasingly dispatched personnel to assist in investigations in other
countries and even began opening permanent offices abroad. 169 As
the United States increased its international law enforcement efforts,
it began to demand greater cooperation in the area of extradition as
well as investigation.170 As a result, any nations that had hitherto
refused to extradite their citizens, including Mexico, Colombia, and
171
the Dominican Republic, began to re-examine their policies.
C. 1997-1999: Meron's Prophecy Realized
The breaking point in Israeli extradition policy, however, did not
occur until Samuel Sheinbein fled to Israel in 1997.172 Just as
Professor Feller's words had proven prophetic with the advent of the
Pesachowitz case, Professor Meron's criticism of the 1978 act
accurately predicted the Sheinbein debacle. Moreover, the Sheinbein
case validated Professor Meron's critique of Israel's extradition policy
just as many Israelis had seen the Pesachowitz case as validating
Professor Feller's.
In September 1997, Sheinbein was accused by Maryland
prosecutors of the grisly murder of Hispanic teenager Enrique Tello,
Jr. 1 73 On September 19, one day after Tello's burned and mutilated
body was discovered by police, Sheinbein disappeared from Maryland,
surfacing in Israel six days later. 174 At first, his family represented
to Maryland authorities that Sheinbein would surrender voluntarily;
however, he was not present on the flight on which he was scheduled
to arrive in the United States. 175 Acting on the request of the United

168.
Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Mafia" Recent Russian
Legislation and Increased BilateralCooperationMay Provide the Means, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 191, 207 n.91 (1996) (listing countries with which the United States had functioning
MLATs). At the time of this writing, the United States has ratified mutual legal
assistance treaties with thirty-six countries, including Israel, and nine other treaties
have been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See Bruce Zagaris,
Uncle Sam Extends Reach for Evidence Worldwide, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2001). in
addition, the United States has begun to enter into multilateral MLATs; an
Organization of American States treaty now under consideration by the Senate would
allow inter-American cooperation in law enforcement. Id. at 9.
169.

ETHAN NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS 103-88 (1993) (describing the

international role taken by U.S. law enforcement officials between 1940 and 1992).
170.
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 334-38.
171.
Id. at 342-43. See also Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 214 (Can.
1985) (stating that "we should not be indifferent to the protection of the public in other
countries ... [iun a shrinking world, we are all our brother's keepers").
172.
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 306-08.
173.

Id. at 309.

174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 309-10.
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in Tel Aviv
States government, Israeli authorities arrested Sheinbein
176
pending the submission of a formal extradition request.
Rather than submitting to extradition, Sheinbein-even though
he had been born in the United States and had never so much as set
foot in Israel prior to murdering Tello--maintained that he was an
177
Israeli citizen from birth and hence could not be extradited.
Specifically, Sheinbein argued that his father was an Israeli citizen
and that, as a result, he was entitled to citizenship under Section 4 of
the Israeli Nationality Law of 1952.178 Because Israeli law permits
dual citizenship, 179 Sheinbein's claim was initially accepted as valid
by Israeli authorities, who offered to pay for a trial in Israel in lieu of
180
extradition.
At this point, the floodgates were opened. The State Attorney of
Montgomery County, Maryland, who was engaged in a tough reelection battle, denounced Israel's refusal to extradite Sheinbein and
He was supported in this
demanded his immediate return.18 1
demand by the large Hispanic population of Montgomery County,
who were incensed at the perceived leniency that Sheinbein would
receive if sentenced in Israel for the murder of a member of their
community. 182 In addition, the call for Sheinbein's return was taken
up by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and by
Representative Robert Livingston of Louisiana, who threatened to
8 3
suspend American aid to Israel unless Sheinbein was extradited.'
Faced with this pressure, Israeli authorities commenced
extradition proceedings against Sheinbein. l8 4 In proceedings before
the Jerusalem District Court, they argued both that Sheinbein was
not an Israeli citizen and alternatively that he should be extradited
because he was only a technical citizen lacking substantial ties to
Israel.' 8 5 Judge Moshe Ravid attempted to mediate the crisis by
suggesting that Sheinbein be extradited to the United States for trial
on condition that he serve his sentence in Israel if convicted. 186 This

Id. at 310.
176.
Id. at 317-18.
177.
178.
Id. at 318. See also Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, 51 (1952) (providing
that "[a] person born while his father or mother is an Israeli national shall be an
Israeli national from birth").
179.
Nationality Law, § 14(b), 6 L.S.I. at 53 (stating that "[an Israel national
who is also a foreign national shall, for the purposes of Israel law, be considered an
Israel national").
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 310.
180.
181.
Id. at 316.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 318-19.
184.
Id. at 318.
185.
Id.
186.
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compromise was rejected by U.S. authorities, requiring Judge Ravid
18 7
to rule on the merits.
On September 6, 1998, Judge Ravid ruled that Sheinbein could
be extradited. 18 8
Rejecting the contention that Sheinbein's
grandparents had renounced their Israeli citizenship, he ruled that
Sheinbein's father-and therefore Sheinbein himself-was an Israeli
citizen.18 9 Nevertheless, he concluded that "Sheinbein is not enough
of a citizen to deserve protection under Israeli law" because he had
never lived in Israel, had used a U.S. passport to enter the country,
and had no meaningful connections to the State of Israel. 190 In doing
so, Judge Ravid noted that "[a] citizenship that is empty of meaning
and all feelings and interest [was] not enough" to entitle Sheinbein to
protection from extradition. 19 1
On February 25, 1999, a divided Supreme Court reversed Judge
192
Ravid's ruling and held that Sheinbein could not be extradited.
The 3-2 decision was made despite a vociferous dissent from Chief
Justice Aharon Barak, who echoed Professor Meron's words of twenty
years previously:
How would a person be perceived, one who has a foreign citizenship and
whose ties are to the foreign country, were he to claim that it would be
unjust to try him in accordance with the laws of that country, whose
culture he is familiar with, whose language he speaks, to which he is
connected, and to which he is tied with all his heartstrings? How can
one justify the claim that the State of Israel-to which he has no
connection nor ties at all ... is the one that must activate against him
19 3
its criminal laws and its criminal jurisdiction?

Thus, like Judge Ravid, Chief Justice Barak proposed a test that
would require Israeli nationals to prove a sufficient connection with
the State of Israel in order to enjoy the benefits of the Offences
Committed Abroad Act. 194
Moreover, even the three-judge majority was clearly reluctant to
allow Sheinbein to remain in Israel, stating that:
One may wonder whether there is in fact material justification for
providing immunity from extradition to those who are citizens but are
not residents of this country, and have no real connection to Israel.
Indeed, it is doubtful that one can identify at all, as a rule, any

187.
188.
189.

Id. at 319.
Id.
Id.

190.

Id.

191.
192.
1999).
193.
194.

Id. at 319-20.
Sheinbein v. Attorney General, Crim. App. 6182/98 53(1) P.D. 625 (Isr.
Id. at 638-39 (Barak, J., dissenting).
Id. at 643-44.
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substantial injustice in having these citizens face justice for offenses
19 5
they have committed, in the country that is the center of their lives.

The majority concluded, however, that it was up to the Knesset,
196
rather than the courts, to remedy the deficiencies in the statute.
On September 2, 1999, the Sheinbein affair came to an end when
Sheinbein pled guilty to murder in a Jerusalem court and was
sentenced to twenty-four years in prison.19 7 By that time, however, it
had become clear to Israeli officials that Israel could not continue to
follow a policy of nonextradition of nationals without jeopardizing its
international relations. It was a foregone conclusion that Israel's
extradition laws would be reformed; the only questions were how soon
and in what manner.

III. THE REFORM MOVEMENT, THE NEW LAW, AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS

The movement to reform Israel's extradition policy had already
198
Not only had
begun considerably prior to the Sheinbein case.
Israel's extradition policy harmed its international relations, but the
existence of the Offences Committed Abroad Act proved to have
1 99
According
unintended and harmful effects on individual Israelis.
nationals
Israeli
Ministry,
Justice
Israeli
by
the
compiled
to statistics
reason
specific
the
for
bail
denied
been
arrested outside Israel had
20 0
Moreover,
risks.
flight
them
rendered
that their nonextraditability
as a prominent Israeli commentator noted, prosecution of fugitives in
lieu of extradition was less practical in Israel than in civil-law

Id. at 660-61 (opinion of Or, J.).
195.
Id. at 656-58. Notably, Judge Or cited the American decision of United
196.
States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that criminal penalties for civil
rights violations under the pre-1996 version 18 U.S.C. § 241 do not apply to acts
against noncitizens), in support of his argument that courts should exercise restraint in
altering legislative determinations concerning the rights of citizenship. Id. at 656
(citing Gaggi, 811 F.2d at 58). Subsequently, on March 22, 1999, the court denied the
government's request for a rehearing en banc. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra

note 6, at 321.
Plushnick & Shaver, supra note 10, at B1. In Maryland, he would have
197.
faced life without parole. See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 319.
Edna Arbel, The Israeli ExtraditionAct: A Suggestion for Reform, 15 JUST.
198.
3, 6 (1997).
Id.
199.
Id. A number of reported decisions in the United States have cited
200.
nonextradition of nationals as a reason for denying bail to citizens of foreign countries
facing American charges. See, e.g., Hababou v. Albright, 82 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350-52
(D.N.J. 2000) (denying bail to French defendant because extradition of nationals was
forbidden under French law); United States v. Stroh, 2000 WL 1832956 (D. Conn. Nov.
3, 2000) (denying bail to accused money launderer with strong Israeli connections
because money laundering was not an extraditable offense under the U.S.-Israeli
treaty).
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countries because Israel had adopted the common law requirement of
confrontation and the prohibition against hearsay evidence. 20 ' This
policy meant that witnesses and physical evidence had to be brought
to Israel from abroad, rendering Israeli trials expensive and often
impracticable. 202 Thus, by the mid-1990s, the Israeli government was
increasingly coming to the conclusion that nonextradition of nationals
was both outdated and harmful to the majority of Israeli nationals
203
who chose to face justice abroad rather than flee.
But for the Sheinbein case, however, extradition reform might
well have been debated for an extended period. As with money
laundering legislation, there was no real sense of urgency in Israel to
reform its extradition policy during the mid-1990s. 204 It was the
Sheinbein affair that gave impetus to the movement to change the
law. In addition to the withering international criticism leveled
against Israel both by political leaders and U.S. editorial columnists,
many Israelis were angered by Sheinbein's cynical manipulation of
their legal system.2 0 5 Although a minority of Israelis supported
Sheinbein's battle against extradition, 20 6 the majority viewed the case
as a graphic illustration .of the domestic and international
weaknesses of Israeli extradition policy. 20 7 Moreover, the high-profile
nature of the Sheinbein case drew attention to other cases in which
Israelis had fled to Israel to escape prosecution and caused both the
U.S. and the Israeli public to regard the extradition statute as an
20 8
immediate and pressing concern.
A. 1996-1999: Two ProposalsFor Reform
Suggestions for reform followed two patterns. The first of these
was proposed soon after Sheinbein's flight to Israel by Edna Arbel,
who was then the chief Israeli prosecutor. 20 9 In a December 1997
article co-authored by Irit Kohn, chief of the international division of
the Israeli Attorney General's office, Arbel suggested that the
Extradition Act be amended to make Israeli citizens extraditable, but

201.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 8.
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 6.
204.
Id. at 5.
205.
See supra notes 172-97 and accompanying text.
206.
See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 314 n.71 (noting that some
Israelis supported Sheinbein due to the danger of anti-Semitism in U.S. prisons and
the possibility of danger to his safety from vengeful Hispanic prison gangs).
207.
Id at 317.
208.
See Matthew Dorf, Israel Extradition Law Offers Help to Alleged Criminals,
JEWISH BULL. N. CAL., Feb. 27, 1998, available at http://www.jewishsf.com/
bk980227/ushelp.htm (stating that, subsequent to the Sheinbein case, five Israelis had
fled to Israel to escape U.S. fraud and money laundering charges).
209.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 3.
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only with a condition. 210 Specifically, Arbel "proposed that Israel's
Extradition Law be amended to permit the extradition of an Israeli
national to a requesting State, provided that the requesting State
agrees in advance that if the Israeli is convicted, he will be returned
211
to serve his sentence in Israel if he so requests.
In support of her suggestion, Arbel noted that the Netherlands
had adopted a similar statute in 1986 and that the Dutch experience
had been "successful. '212 In fact, even prior to 1986, the Netherlands
had allowed for the possibility of prisoner transfer in its extradition
treaty with the United States. 213 Article 8(1) of this treaty, which
was signed in 1980 and ratified in 1983, provides that "[i]n the event
there is a treaty in force between the Contracting Parties on the
execution of foreign'penal sanctions, neither Contracting Party may
refuse to extradite its own nationals solely on the basis of their
214
nationality."
Although the Netherlands was the only nation prior to the
amendment of the Israeli extradition statute to enact legislation
conditioning extradition on transfer of penal sanctions, the concept
was hardly a new one. As early as 1970, a European commentator
had suggested conditional extradition as an alternative solution for
nations that refused to extradite their nationals, 2 15 and a similar

210.
Id. at 9-10.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. at 10. The Dutch statute upon which current Israeli law is modeled is
Section 4(2) of the Extradition Act (Neth. 1986), which states that extradition of Dutch
nationals may only be permitted if "in the opinion of the Dutch Minister of Justice
there is sufficient guarantee that if the national should be sentenced to an
unconditional custodial sentence in the requesting State for the offenses for which his
extradition is granted, the national would be able to serve such sentence in the
Netherlands." In 1986, the Netherlands also adopted domestic legislation permitting
the enforcement of foreign criminal judgments.
See Law on the Transfer and
Enforcement of Criminal Judgments, Stb. No. 464/1986 (Neth. Sept. 10, 1986). These
two domestic laws followed a 1983 amendment to the Dutch Constitution that
specifically permitted the extradition of nationals. See D.J.M.W. Paridaens, The
Extradition of NationalsAccording to Dutch Law, 62 INT'L R. PENAL L. 515, 516 (1990).
Prior to 1983, "it was assumed that the Dutch Constitution prohibited the extradition
of nationals," although such extradition was apparently not explicitly forbidden. Id.
213.
Extradition Treaty, June 24, 1980, U.S.-Neth., art. 8, 35 U.S.T. 1334, 1338.
214.
Id. This provision, however, was never used prior to the amendment in the
Dutch Extradition Act, as the Netherlands did not accede to the Council of Europe
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons until September 30, 1987. See
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 27 I.L.M. 275
(entered into force July 1, 1985). The United States and the Netherlands were not
parties to a bilateral agreement on the transfer of penal sanctions, so the condition
precedent set by the Dutch-American extradition treaty was not fulfilled until the
Netherlands acceded to the convention. Id. Moreover, the treaty provision was
arguably unconstitutional under Dutch law at the time it was drafted. See Paridaens,
supra note 212, at 516 (noting that the Dutch Constitution was assumed to prohibit the
extradition of nationals prior to 1983).
215.
See Plachta, supra note 73, at 116 n.150 (1999) (citing H. Schultz, Les
formes nouvelles de la collaborationdes ttats dans l'administrationde la justicepnale,
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provision was included in a 1978 model extradition treaty that
foreshadowed the Dutch-American treaty of 1980.116 In April 1996,
the Group of Seven recommended, as one of three alternative
solutions to the problem of nonextradition of nationals, that nations
"allow for conditional extradition on the condition that it is only for
trial and that its national be promptly returned after trial to its
territory for service of any sentence within the limits of the law of the
''2 17
Requested State.
The concept of conditional extradition gained further support
during the late 1990s. In December 1997, a conditional extradition
provision was included for the first time in a multilateral treaty, the
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings. 218 Section 8(2) of this treaty, adopted at the insistence of
the United States, provided that a state could comply with its
extradition obligations under the convention by surrendering an
accused terrorist bomber for trial on the condition that he be returned
to his native country to serve his sentence. 219 Moreover, even where
conditional extradition was not specifically required by domestic law
or treaty, it was "not uncommon" by 1998 for requested states to
require advance agreement to repatriation prior to honoring an
extradition request. 220

Thus, even though the Netherlands was the

only country to have specifically included such conditions in domestic
legislation at the time of the Arbel article, Arbel was able to state
confidently that "such provisions may become the trend in countries
'22 1
which do not extradite their own nationals.
in L'AMELIORATION DE LA JUSTICE R9PRESSIVE PAR LE DROIT EUROPtEN 104 (P. Vander
ed. 1970)); see also SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126-27 (1971)

(suggesting that the most appropriate sites for adjudication and rehabilitation could be
secured by extraditing nationals for trial on condition that they be repatriated to serve
any sentences imposed).
216.
See Model Convention on Expatriation of Accused Persons for Trial and
Sentence and Repatriation for Enforcement of Sentence, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 58TH CONFERENCE 380-90 (1978). The model convention

has been cited as an inspiration for the Dutch legislation. See Plachta, supra note 73,
at 116 n.150.
217.
Senior Experts on Transnational Organized Crime, P8-Senior Experts'
Group Recommendations (Apr. 12, 1996), § 10(1), available at wysiwyg://395/http://
www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/crime/40pts.htm.
Section 10(2) of the Senior Experts'
recommendations also suggested that states permit the transfer or surrender of their
nationals for trial, conditional upon advance agreement to allow them to serve their
sentences in their native countries, where surrender without formal extradition was
permitted by domestic law. Id. § 10(2).
218.
United Nations: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249.
219.
Id. art. 8(2). For a discussion of the United States' role in securing the
adoption of this provision, see Samuel M. Witten, The InternationalConvention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 774, 779 (1998).
220.
John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 206 (1998).
221.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 10.
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In addition, as Arbel noted, the administration of foreign
sentences was not without precedent under Israeli law. 222 Section
1(3) of the 1978 Offences Committed Abroad Act permitted Israel to
take over the enforcement of a foreign sentence if an Israeli national
223
fled to Israel after being sentenced rather than before trial.
Moreover, in 1996, Israel acceded to the Council of Europe
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, commonly known
as the Strasbourg Convention, 224 and simultaneously adopted
domestic legislation providing for the repatriation of foreign nationals
imprisoned in Israel and the administration of foreign sentences in
2 25
the event that Israelis imprisoned abroad were returned to Israel.
Accordingly, if the Israeli Extradition Act was to be amended to allow
extradition upon condition of repatriation after sentence, a
mechanism for enforcing the foreign sentence was already in place.
Other, more practical, reasons also supported conditional
extradition of Israeli nationals. As noted by Arbel, extradition
conditioned upon transfer of penal sanctions would serve the
objectives of law enforcement by allowing trials to take place where
the crime was committed and where witnesses could be
subpoenaed.2 2 6 At the same time, such a policy would serve the
humanitarian end of permitting convicts to serve their sentences
22 7
close to their families and be rehabilitated in their native culture.
Moreover, such a provision would not sacrifice the objectives of the
22 8
Offences Committed Abroad Act.
Although the ostensible primary reason for the 1978 act was to
protect Israelis from anti-Semitism in foreign courts, 229 subsequent

222.
Id. at 9-10.
See Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Act, § 1(3), 32
223.
L.S.I. 63.
224.
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, 22 I.L.M.
530. For a discussion of the provisions of the Strasbourg Convention and their impact
upon Israeli extradition law, see infra notes 481-86 and accompanying text.
225.
Law Transferring Prisoners to their Own Country, 1996 S.H. 1603, as
amended, 1999 S.H. 1720.
226.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 10.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
See Sheinbein v. State of Israel, Cr.A. 6182/90 53(1) P.D. 625, 632-45 (Isr.
229.
1999) (Barak, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Barak cited three reasons in support of the
1978 legislation:
The first reason is that it would be unjust to try a person in a country whose
laws he is unfamiliar with, and whose language he does not speak. It is
improper to sever a person from his country, from his family, from his nation
and from his people, those who are his natural judges. The second reason is
that a country has an obligation toward its citizens, to protect them from a
different judicial system ... [and] the third reason is that one cannot trust an
alien judicial system, and one cannot be certain that a foreign judicial
proceeding would mete out justice to one who is not "its" citizen.
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events made clear that foreign prison conditions were a much more
pressing concern.23 0 In the Nakash case, for instance, the qualms of
the Israeli Attorney General about surrendering Nakash to France
were predicated not upon any unfairness of the French judicial
system but upon the possible danger to his life from Arab gangs in
French prisons. 231 In the Sheinbein case itself, one of the key reasons
for nonextradition cited by Sheinbein's supporters was the possible
danger to his life from Hispanic gangs if incarcerated in the United
States. 23 2 The Knesset debates following the Sheinbein case likewise
revealed a concern that "an Israeli citizen who ... ha[s] been here for
many years" should not be required to "serve his sentence in a foreign
'233
land, far from his home, distant from his family.
There are several reasons why the possibility of foreign
incarceration is a much more practical consideration for Israelis than
the possibility of trial in a foreign country. As noted by Arbel and
others before her, Israel simply does not conclude extradition treaties
with countries where anti-Semitism is rampant in the judicial
system. 23 4 Israel is currently a party to the European Convention on

Id. at 636-37.
230.
In addition, Professor Meron has pointed out that, as long as Israel has
control over its nationals after sentencing, "the possibility of release from
imprisonment [exists] in the rare cases where a miscarriage of justice may be
considered to have occurred." Meron, supra note 78, at 225 n.32 (paraphrasing
SHEARER, supra note 215, at 127). This possibility may be given effect due to the fact
that, under the Strasbourg Convention, Israel has ultimate authority to pardon or
parole a repatriated prisoner according to Israeli law in the event that it deems a
conviction unfair or a sentence too severe. See infra notes 481-93 and accompanying
text (discussing the provisions of the Strasbourg Convention relating to pardon and
parole). The authority to release Israeli nationals upon repatriation, although it
should be used sparingly if at all, can be regarded as a final safeguard in the event that
an Israeli is subjected to anti-Semitic prosecution abroad despite the precautions built
into Israeli pre-extradition proceedings.
231.
See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
232.
See supra note 206.
233.
Proceedings of the Knesset Committee for Constitution, Law and
Jurisprudence, statement of MK Hanan Porat (1999), quoted in Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99,
Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 56 (Jm. 2000) (Harosh 1); see also id. (statement
of MK Tal) (stating that "in my opinion if a Jewish prisoner is serving time in Florida
and is in danger and it is possible to transfer him from Florida to a jail [in Israel] this
should be done"). For additional Israeli authorities citing foreign prison conditions as a
reason for nonextradition of nationals, see S.Z. FELLER, EXTRADITION LAWS 122 (1980)
(stating that the goals of punishment and rehabilitation are stymied by incarceration of
a convicted criminal outside his native country); see also Proceedings of the Knesset
Committee for Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence, statement of MK Glass, Knesset
Transcript 81 (1978), quoted in Harosh I, supra, at 46 (citing the possibility of foreign
incarceration as one of the reasons for the proposal of the Offences Committed Abroad
Act).
234.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 5. See also Meron, supra note 78, at 222 (stating
that "Israel has concluded extradition agreements with States that have legal systems
and traditions it felt it could trust"); Harvard Research, supra note 82, at 128-29
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Extradition, consisting primarily of Western European countries; in
addition, Israel has bilateral extradition treaties with the United
States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Fiji, and Swaziland. 235 Few,
if any, of these countries are likely to deny a fair trial to an Israeli
Jew on account of his citizenship or religion. Moreover, because
Israeli law forbids extradition in the absence of a treaty, 236 there is no
danger that Israeli nationals might be extradited to a country with
widespread anti-Semitism through non-treaty-based agreement
between Israeli and foreign prosecutors.
In addition, even though the accession of such countries 2as
37
Russia and Ukraine to the European Convention on Extradition
might raise the specter of anti-Semitic influences in the judicial
system, this danger is alleviated by the terms of the convention itself.
Specifically, Article 3(2) of the convention states that a person shall
not be extradited if the requested state
has substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition for
an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be
23 8
prejudiced for any of these reasons.

(stating that distrust of a foreign legal system could be a ground for refusing
extradition outright but not for distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens).
235.
Arbel, supra note 198, at 5.
236.
See Extradition Act, § 2(1), 8 L.S.I. at 144.
237.
See Dan Izenberg, Court Allows First Extradition to Russia, JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at 6A (noting that Russia ratified the convention on March 9,
2000); see also Prosecutor Criticizes Parliament'sMoves in Case of Formner Premier,
BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD., Oct. 13, 1999 (excerpting Ukrainian Television First
Program of 11 October 1999) (noting that Ukraine ratified the convention on January
16, 1998). Recently, Hungary has also become a party to the convention. See Police
Intend to Call for Extradition of Former Government Official, HUNGARIAN NEWS
AGENCY (MTI), Dec. 5, 2001 (quoting Hungarian Justice Ministry official Ildiko Gal as
stating that "there is a valid extradition agreement between Hungary and Israel").
The possibility of anti-Semitic influence in the Russian judicial system is likely to come
into play due to the recent arrival of media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky in Israel after
a Spanish court refused a Russian extradition request. In Israel, Goussinsky Fights
Extraditionto Russia, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 27, 2001, at 1A. While Israeli authorities
have acknowledged that extradition would be possible in the event that Russia
submitted a request to Israel, commentators have noted that extradition is unlikely
due to the support of Israeli political leaders and Jewish organizations. Id.; see also
Uri Dan, Russian Tycoon Takes Refuge in Tel Aviv, N.Y. POST, Apr. 29, 2001, at 22
(stating that Gusinsky had the support of several Israeli political figures and that he
"arrived in Israel . . . knowing he won't be extradited because he is regarded as a
political refugee").
238.
European Convention on Extradition, supra note 60, § 3(2). This rule
abrogates the traditional rule of non-inquiry into the fairness of a requesting state's
justice system. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329-31 (1st Cir. 1993)
(considering a similar provision in the extradition treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom and noting that it permits limited inquiry into the potential
for discrimination in requesting state); see also In re Requested Extradition of Smyth,
61 F.3d 711, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (reading the same provision as allowing
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This policy is critical in that the European Convention is the only
multilateral extradition treaty to which Israel is a party, and
therefore the only agreement in which Israel does not have full
control as to its treaty partners. 239 Thus, Israel is free both to decline
to enter bilateral treaties with countries where anti-Semitic
prosecutions might be instituted and to refuse extradition should any
such country accede to the European Convention.
Moreover, Israeli domestic law is not without safeguards if it
appears that charges have been lodged due to anti-Semitism. The
Israeli extradition statute contains a provision mirroring that of the
European Convention, which allows a court to refuse extradition if it
finds "reasonable grounds" that the accusation "arises from racial
discrimination. '240 In addition, like most common-law countries,
Israel requires prima facie evidence that a fugitive has committed a
crime as a condition of extradition. 241 In fact, in its ratification of the
European extradition convention, which did not require such
evidence, Israel specifically reserved its right to honor extradition
242
requests only if prima facie proof were presented with the request.
Thus, an Israeli magistrate would have the power to deny extradition
in the event that the evidence submitted with the request revealed
that the charges had been fabricated for anti-Semitic reasons.
Even where charges are genuine, the discretion permitted to the
Attorney General by the Israeli Extradition Act provides a further

consideration of the "treatment the accused will likely receive at the hands of the
requesting country's criminal justice system"); Richard J. Wilson, Toward the
Enforcement of Universal Human Rights Through Abrogation of the Rule of NonInquiry in Extradition, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 751, 763 (1997) (discussing the
European Convention).
239.
See Yaffa Zilbershats, Extraditing Israeli Citizens to the United States:
Extradition and Citizenship Dilemmas, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 297, 307-09 (2000).
240.
Meron, supra note 78, at 222-23 (citing Extradition Act, § 10, 8 L.S.I. at
145).
241.
See, e.g., Attorney General v. Freedman, 40(4) P.D. 301, 305; Kamiar v.
State of Israel, 22(2) P.D. 85, 115.
242.
See Arbel, supra note 198, at 6. This requirement has, on occasion, caused
friction between Israel and certain European countries. For instance, tensions arose
between Israel and France in early 2001 after Israel refused an extradition request for
twelve fugitives with dual French and Israeli nationality because French authorities
had not presented prima facie evidence of guilt. See Schuster, supra note 28, at 4.
This refusal led to mutual recriminations, with French authorities accusing Israel of
foot-dragging and harboring fugitives and Israeli officials responding that the France
had only itself to blame for submitting incomplete documentation. Id.; see also Thierry
Leveque, Israel Denies Protecting Fugitives from French Law, JERUSALEM POST, Feb.
25, 2001, at 4 (quoting French prosecutor Francois Franchi as saying that Israel had
made no effort to track the fugitives down and had "put itself beyond the pale of the
international community"); Israel Rejects French Criticism of Failure to Extradite in
Money Laundering Case, supra note 162 (quoting an Israeli Justice Ministry
spokesman as saying that "[i]t has been a year since the French promised to pass on to
Israel material that would make it possible to move forward in dealing with the
[extradition] but they have not done so yet").
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safeguard in cases where anti-Semitic influeric'es in foreign
jurisdictions might prevent the charges from being adjudicated
fairly. 243 Section 2 of the Act provides that the Attorney General
"may," rather than "shall," honor an extradition request if the other
statutory conditions are satisfied. 244 The Israeli Supreme Court has
interpreted this section as making extradition a discretionary rather
than a mandatory act. 245 This discretion was exercised by thenAttorney General Avraham Sharir in declining to extradite Nakash
2 46
on the ground that his life might be in danger in a French prison.
While the Israeli Supreme Court found that Sharir had abused his
discretion by acting without sufficient proof of danger to Nakash's
life, it left open the possibility that extradition might properly be
When combined with the
denied if such evidence existed. 247
antidiscrimination provision of the European Convention, this
discretion provides an avenue of relief should an Israeli national
prove that he will be unable to receive a fair trial in a foreign country
due to anti-Semitism. It should be noted that this provision has been
invoked by Israel on at least one recent occasion in refusing a
Lithuanian request for the extradition of suspected KGB officer
2 48
Nachman Dushansky.

See Extradition Act, § 18, 8 L.S.I. at 147. It should be noted that section 10
243.
of the Extradition Act, which allows a court to refuse extradition in the event that an
accusation "arises from" racial or religious discrimination, pertains only to racially
motivated charges and not to the possibility of anti-Semitic influence in cases where
charges are properly brought. See Extradition Act, § 10(a), 8 L.S.I. at 145.
244. See id. § 18, 8 L.S.I. at 147.
245.
See Nakash v. State of Israel, 40(4) P.D. 78.
246. Id. at 86.
247.
Id. at 93. Such proof might consist, for example, of evidence that antiSemitism has infected the judicial system of the requested state on past occasions. Id.
But see In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 719-22 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that accused IRA member was required to prove that he personally, as
opposed to Catholics or IRA members in general, likely would be subject to
discrimination upon return to Northern Ireland, and that he could not rely upon past
instances of prejudice to prove likelihood of discrimination in the future). The Ninth
Circuit decision in Smyth reversed a decision by a Federal magistrate judge holding
that the petitioner had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-Catholic
bias was pervasive in the Northern Ireland criminal justice system and that he would
likely be subjected to adverse prison conditions if incarcerated in Maze Prison. See In
re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1146-52 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The
decision of the Ninth Circuit is, of course, not binding on Israeli courts, which could
choose instead to adopt the scheme of proof established by the magistrate judge. This
is especially so given that the Israeli statute requires only that the accused show
"reasonable grounds," rather than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, to
demonstrate that extradition should be denied in cases where charges are allegedly
motivated by anti-Semitism. See Meron, supra note 78, at 222-23.
248.
See Israel Refuses Lithuanian Request to Interview KGB Officer Wanted for
Genocide, BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 22, 2001 (stating that Israeli authorities
believed that Duchansky had been singled out for prosecution because other, nonJewish officers living in Lithuania had not been charged).
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These safeguards, however, are much weaker in practical terms
when prison conditions rather than trial are at issue. A courtroom is
a much more controlled environment than a prison. In the countries
with which Israel has concluded extradition treaties, trials are open
processes that can be monitored by Israeli diplomats, and any antiSemitic influences can be quickly detected and protested. Prisons,
however, are closed environments that are subject to much less
judicial scrutiny and cannot be monitored continuously. 249 Moreover,
Jews form a very small minority in most Western prison populations
and are often at risk from anti-Semitic inmate gangs.25 0 In the
United States, for instance, white-supremacist prison gangs have
committed anti-Semitic assaults, and African-American gangs, such
as the Bloods, also have anti-Semitic elements. 25 1 Prison guards, who
frequently come from rural areas where few, if any, Jews live, might
also be less than accommodating to Jewish concerns or might even be
anti-Semitic themselves.2 52 Thus, even in countries where anti-

249.
See, e.g., In re New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 694
N.Y.S.2d 170, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (Peters, J., dissenting) (noting that U.S.
prisons are a "netherworld" where correction officers have broad latitude in their dayto-day interactions with prisoners); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)
(stating that courts should afford prison officials broad deference in the administration
of their institutions).
250.
See generally Tex. Dep't Criminal Justice, Texas Prison Gangs, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 16, 2001, at 6A (describing in detail the common gangs in Texas
prisons).
251.
See, e.g., Douglas Belkin, Advocates: Jewish Comnunity Shuns Its Inmates,
PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 2, 1998, at 1B (discussing harassment of Jewish prisoners in
Florida by fellow inmates); Ronald Smothers, State is Trying to Arrange Another TV
Broadcast by Rioting Ohio Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, § 1, at 30 (discussing an
anti-Semitic act by a white supremacist organization in an American prison); Gary
Rosenberger, A Chaplain for Jews in Prison, U.P.I., Sept. 1, 1989 (describing antiSemitism within black prison gangs).
252.
Compelling evidence of this can be demonstrated by examining cases from
New York State, which contains the largest Jewish population in the United States.
See, e.g., New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v.
State of New York, 726 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (N.Y. 1999) (affirming a judgment ordering
reinstatement of a state corrections officer, Edward Kuhnel, who was discharged for
flying a Nazi flag from his porch); In re New York State Law Enforcement Officers
Union, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 177 (Peters, J., dissenting) (noting that Kuhnel had previously
been involved in white supremacist activities and arguing that his discharge was
warranted in light of the "deleterious effects of allowing militant white supremacists to
stand guard over the safety and welfare of racial minorities"); Curle v. Ward, 399
N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified, 389 N.E.2d 1070 (N.Y. 1979) (reinstating
corrections officer who had been discharged for suspected Ku Klux Klan membership);
Bass v. Grottoli, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15204 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying summary
judgment to state in civil rights case where New York prison inmates alleged
numerous anti-Semitic acts by guards). Similar incidents have been reported in other
states having substantial Jewish populations. See, e.g., Weicherding v. Riegel, 981 F.
Supp. 1143 (C.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding dismissal of
Illinois correction officer who was a member of the Ku Klux Klan); Lawrenz v. James,
852 F. Supp. 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (upholding discharge of Florida correction officer
who wore t-shirt adorned with a swastika and the words "white power"). Even in the
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Semitism in the justice system is not a danger, Jewish prisoners
might still face adverse conditions.
In addition, while such conditions might possibly justify
discretionary refusal of extradition under the Nakash precedent, they
will often be difficult to prove due to lack of documentation and
variation between prisons within the foreign country.2 53 Moreover,
unlike cases where charges are brought for anti-Semitic reasons, the
Israeli courts have no statutory authority to refuse extradition due to
prison conditions, so the recourse of the accused would only be to the
Attorney General. 254 Refusal to extradite under such conditions
might also constitute a breach of the European Convention on
Extradition, as the antidiscrimination provision of that treaty
concerns only prejudice at trial. 255 Thus, Arbel's suggestion for
conditional extradition was founded, not only upon growing
international precedent, but upon the very considerations of
protection of Israeli citizens that formed the underpinning of the
Offences Committed Abroad Act.
The other primary suggestion for post-Sheinbein extradition
reform, however, was entirely unprecedented. This reform was the
proposal, first made by Judge Ravid of the Jerusalem District Court
and later adopted by Chief Justice Aharon Barak in his dissenting

absence of outright anti-Semitism, Jewish prisoners can often face more prosaic
difficulties, including restrictions on diet, facial hair, or religious garb. See generally
Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food,
Skullcaps and Beards, 21 AM.J. CRIM. L. 241 (1994); see also Johnson v. Horn, 150
F.3d 276, 284-86 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that diet of cold vegetables, bread, and vanillaflavored liquid nutritional supplement was sufficient to satisfy requirement that
Jewish inmates in New Jersey be provided with kosher meals).
253.
See, e.g., Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement
in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577 (1992) (discussing
differences among women's prisons in the United States).
254.
See Extradition Act, § 10(a), 8 L.S.I. at 145 (specifying that a court may
refuse extradition where "the accusation or request arises from racial or religious
discrimination").
255.
See European Convention on Extradition, supra note 60, § 3(2). The treaty
provision specifying that extradition may be denied if the fugitive's "position may be
prejudiced" due to his religion, might arguably apply to cases where the fugitive would
be prejudiced due to prison conditions, but the context of this language deals
exclusively with the possibility of fabricated charges or unfair trials. Id. While the
Smyth decisions applied a similar provision of the U.S.-British extradition treaty to
prison conditions, the language of that treaty-unlike that of the European Convention
or the Israeli domestic legislation-specifically provided that extradition could be
denied if the fugitive "would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality
or political opinions." See Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.U.K., art. 3(a), Exec. It should also be noted that the United States has "strenuously
resisted" the inclusion of antidiscrimination provisions in extradition treaties. Wilson,
supra note 238, at 763. Thus, there is no treaty provision expressly protecting Israeli
citizens sought by the United States, which form a significant percentage of requests
for extradition from Israel.
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opinion, that Israeli citizens be divided into residents and
No country had ever
nonresidents for extradition purposes. 2 56
divided its citizens into classes that had varying degrees of protection
25 7
under the criminal law.
The separation of Israeli citizens into residents and
nonresidents, however, was virtually dictated by the facts of the
Sheinbein case. 25 8 Moreover, the division of Israeli nationals into
classes was made necessary by the nature of Israeli citizenship
itself. 259 The Israeli citizenship law is one of the most stringent in
the world in the area of protecting citizens' right to retain their
nationality.2 60
An Israeli national does not lose his status by
accepting citizenship in another country, and Israeli citizenship
cannot even be voluntarily renounced without the express consent of
the Minister of the Interior. 261 Moreover, any person born to at least
one Israeli citizen parent is an Israeli citizen from birth, whether or
not he was born in Israel. 2 62 In addition, Israel has traditionally been
a country of high emigration as well as immigration, with Israeli
citizens frequently returning to the countries of their ancestry to
rejoin their families.2 63 Thus, it was inevitable that Israel-even
more than most countries-would accumulate a class of nonresident
citizens, some of whom had never even set foot in Israel despite
possessing Israeli nationality from birth.
In addition, Israel is one of a very few countries where foreigners
with no previous ties to the country can obtain immediate
citizenship. 264 A majority of immigrants to Israel arrive as olim
under the Law of Return, which confers citizenship "from the date of
aliyah"-the date of immigration. 265 This means that it is possible for
a Jew to acquire Israeli citizenship prior to beginning the years-long
process of building a life in and developing ties to Israel.

See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
256.
See Sheinbein, 53(1) P.D. at 656-61.
257.
258.
See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
259.
See generally Shachar, supra note 23, at 234-37.
260.
Id. at 264.
261.
Id.
262.
Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, 51, § 4.
263.
See, e.g., Calev Ben-David, A Vote for Post-Zionism, JERUSALEM POST, Jan.
28, 1997, at 6 (noting that 600,000 Israelis were living abroad).
264.
Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, § 1 (stating that "every Jew has the right
to come to this country as an oleh"). See also Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 2(a)
(providing that "every oleh under the Law of Return . . . shall become an Israeli
national"). Germany has a statute similar to the Law of Return; however, ethnic
Germans are required to show "strong cultural, especially linguistic, linkage to the
German nation in order to acquire immediate German citizenship." See Peter H.
Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 209 n.59 (2000). In
addition, the German legislature acted in 1993 to place an annual limit on the number
of ethnic Germans who could obtain immediate citizenship through return. Id.
265.
Nationality Law, 1951, 6 L.S.I. 50, § 2(b)(2).
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In contrast, the great majority of nations allow foreigners to
become citizens only after an extended period. 266 In the United
States, for example, an alien admitted as a permanent resident can
generally become a citizen only after a period of five years' continuous
residence and must be physically present in the United States for at
least half of that period. 267 Moreover, an absence of six months or
more will break the continuity of residence unless the applicant can
prove that he did not abandon his residence during that period, and
an absence of one year or more will break the continuity of residence
unless prior permission is obtained from the Attorney General. 268
Thus, by the time a resident alien acquires U.S. nationality, he has
already been a resident of the United States for several years and has
developed bona fide ties to the country. In contrast, this fact is often
not the case with Israeli citizens, which means that a reason exists
for dividing Israeli nationals into classes that does not exist in other
countries.
Accordingly, the amended Israeli extradition statute ultimately
adopted by the Knesset included elements of both the Arbel and
Ravid proposals. As originally drafted, the proposed amendment
provided that a fugitive who was both an Israeli citizen and an Israeli
resident at the time of the commission of the offense could only be
extradited on condition of repatriation after sentence, while all other
citizens were subject to unconditional extradition.2 69 The Knesset
Committee for Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence, however,
substituted a provision under which persons who were Israeli
nationals and residents at the time an extradition request was made
would be entitled to repatriation, regardless of whether they were
residents at the time of the commission of the offense. 270 The reasons
for this were twofold. One was the committee members' concern that,
due to the fact that residency was undefined in the amendment,
Israelis who committed crimes during relatively brief absences from
Israel might be subject to unconditional extradition.2 7 1 In addition,
the committee was concerned that, if an extradition request were

266.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1430 (2001) (stating that, in the United States,
aliens are required to reside in the country for three to five years before becoming
citizens).
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (2001). A shorter waiting period of three years is
267.
provided for spouses of servicemen, and up to five aliens a year may be granted
immediate citizenship based on "extraordinary contributions to national security." 8
U.S.C. §§ 1430(a), 1427(0(1) (2001).
268.
8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (2001). A resident alien absent from the United States
for a year or more must also establish that he is employed by the U.S. government, a
U.S. research institution, or a corporation engaged in the development of foreign trade
or commerce of the United States. Id.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 55-56.
269.
270.
Id. at 56.
Id. (citing Proceedings of the Knesset Committee for Constitution, Law and
271.
Jurisprudence, statement of MK Hanan Porat).
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made many years after the commission of a crime, a person who had
shifted his entire personal and family life to Israel might be subjected
27 2
to extended incarceration in a foreign land.
The bill in its altered version echoed a proposal made during the
Sheinbein crisis by MK Amnon Rubinstein, who suggested that
Israeli citizens should be made extraditable unless they had lived in
2 73
Israel at least one year prior to the extradition request being made.
The 1999 amendment, however, did not include a definite time period
such as that proposed by Rubinstein, as the Knesset committee
rejected a suggestion by MK Reuven Rivlin for "an obligatory
examination . . . on the issue of the length of stay in Israel which
would grant residence to a fugitive." 274 Nevertheless, the final draft
of the bill retained the provision setting the relevant point in time for
determining citizenship and residency as the date of the extradition
2 75
request rather than the date the offense was committed.
Accordingly, the amended statute provided that "[a] person who
committed an extraditable offense . . . and who is an Israeli citizen
and an Israeli national at the time of the extradition request" would
not be extradited unless "[t]he country requesting his extradition
commits itself in advance to transfer him back to Israel to serve his
'276
sentence there, if he is convicted and a prison sentence is imposed.
On the other hand, persons who were not Israeli citizens or Israeli
residents at the time of the extradition request would be extradited
unconditionally.2 77 The statute, however, left the term "Israeli
resident" undefined rather than adopting the tests suggested by
Ravid or Barak. 278 The new law, the Extradition Act (Amendment
No. 6), was passed by the Knesset on April 19, 1999 and entered into

272.
Id. See also id. at 50-51 (discussing the committee proceedings).
273.
Keinon, supra note 36, at 11.
274.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 56. MK
Rivlin's evident intention was that a minimum period of residency should be
established in order to prevent fugitives who had lived in Israel for a short time from
claiming the protection of the law, See Knesset Transcript, supra note 271 (statement
of MK Rivlin). Specifically, he stated that
. .. not only does a Jewish criminal libel the Jewish nation, but then he seeks
refuge in it. When a person asks for the protection of the state we have to
examine if he truly has connections to the state and is not a person who, after
committing a crime ... states, "I am a Jew, protect me from those nations who
I harmed."

Id.
275.
Extradition Act (Amend. No. 6), § 1(A)(1) (1999). The amended act also
specified that extradition must be sought for the purposes of bringing the fugitive to
trial in the requesting state rather than in some other country. Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. § 1(A)(2).
278.
Id. § I(A)(1).
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force on April 29-ironically, barely two months after the Israeli
2 79
Supreme Court's decision in Sheinbein.
B. 1999-2001: The IsraeliExperience Under The Amended Act
As of May 2001, seven extradition requests have been made
under the new statute. 28 0 Of these, five have been made by the
United States, one by Canada and one by Russia. 28 ' Three have
resulted in decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court, and three others
282
have resulted in lower court decisions.
Thus far, interpretation of the statute has centered on two
primary issues: whether it is retroactively applicable to crimes
committed before its effective date and the method of determining
whether an Israeli citizen is a resident or nonresident. Ironically,
however, the first case to reach the Israeli courts under the 1999
amendment raised neither of these issues. This was the case of
Daniel Weiz, a nineteen-year-old Israeli citizen accused in the murder
of Dimitri (Matty) Baranovsky while on leave from the Israeli army in

November

1999.283

According to Canadian authorities, Weiz, together with a group
of approximately fifteen other Russian and Israeli youths, entered G.
Ross Lord Park in Toronto on the night of November 14, 1999 with
the intention of fighting a rival Russian gang. 284 Instead, they found
Baranovsky and several friends, none of whom were associated with
the gang they had come to fight. 285 Deprived of their chosen target,
they demanded money and cigarettes from Baranovsky and his
friends-a confrontation that ended when Baranovsky was knocked
to the ground and kicked to death. 288 According to witnesses who
cooperated with the Toronto police, Weiz-who returned to his Israeli
military unit a week after the killing-participated in pummeling and
28 7
kicking Baranovsky.
The subsequent extradition proceeding was the first to take place
under the 1999 legislation. 288 The retroactivity of the new law,
however, was not at issue because the murder of Baranovsky was

279.
Harosh, Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99 at 8.
See infra notes 283-441 and accompanying text.
280.
281.
See id.
282.
See id.
Attorney General v. Weiz (Decision on Bail Application) (unreported) (Jm.
283.
Feb. 2, 2000) (Arad, J.).
Id.
284.
285.
Id.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
See Heidi J. Gleit & Aryeh O'Sullivan, Soldier Arrested in Toronto Murder,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20, 1999, at 2 (stating that "Weiz would be the first Israeli
extradited since the Knesset altered the Extradition law...").
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committed after the effective date of the act. The Weiz proceeding
was first simply because Canadian authorities acted with remarkable
dispatch, submitting a formal extradition request barely a month
28 9
after the killing.
Nor was Weiz' Israeli residency an issue in the courts. After
being informed of Weiz' fugitive status, the Israeli Attorney General's
office made an initial determination that he was an Israeli resident
and informed Canadian authorities that extradition proceedings
would only be instituted if Canada agreed in advance to allow him to
29 0
return to Israel to serve any sentence that might be imposed.
Subsequently, Canadian authorities undertook such a commitment,
Weiz' sole
and extradition proceedings were commenced. 291
remaining line of defense was to attack the prima facie case
submitted against him by Ontario prosecutors by claiming that it was
built on perjured evidence. 292 The Israeli courts rejected this defense
and extradited Weiz to Canada on October 29, 2000.293
It was left for the next court to grapple with the issue of who was
and was not an Israeli resident for the purpose of the amended
extradition statute. This issue occurred in the case of Sharon Harosh,
an Israeli national wanted on a number of state and federal charges
in New York.2 94 In the initial extradition request, it was alleged that
Harosh "posed as [a] stock broker . . . and contacted, via the
telephone, elderly people, encouraging them to invest in the shares of
a company named Blackwell. ''295 In fact, Blackwell was a fictitious
company, and the funds invested by the victims-totaling $185,000were transferred to bank accounts outside the United States,
including accounts located in Israel. 296 Based on these allegations,
New York state authorities charged Harosh with grand larceny,
possession of stolen property, and violation of commercial
2 97
regulations.

289.
See Attorney General v. Weiz (Decision on Bail Application) (unreported)
(Jm. Feb. 2, 2000) (Arad, J.). The extradition request, accompanied by supporting
affidavits, was submitted on December 17, 1999. Id. See also Sam Pazzano, Canuck
Law Whiz for Weiz in Matti Killing Case, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 6, 2000, at 37 (quoting
Weiz' Canadian attorney, Edward Greenspan, concerning the extradition request and
Weiz' arrest in Israel).
Nicholas Keung, Israel's High Court Orders Murder Suspect to Canada,
290.
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 6, 2000.
See Extradition Act (Amendment No. 6), § I(A)(1) (1999).
291
292.
Attorney General v. Weiz (unreported) (Jm. Feb. 2, 2000) (Arad, J.).
293.
Gretchen Drummie, Weiz Flown to Toronto, TORONTO SUN, Oct. 31, 2000, at
4. A preliminary hearing in Toronto was scheduled for July 9, 2001. Court Sets July
Preliminary Hearingfor IsraeliFacing Murder Charges,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan.
8, 2001. As of this writing, the Weiz case is still in the pretrial stage.

294.
295.
296.
297.

Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at at 2-6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id.at 3.
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Subsequently, an additional extradition petitiori'was submitted
detailing another fraud allegedly committed by Harosh 298 In this
case, Harosh solicited investments in a company named Goldman,
Lender & Co. Holdings. 299 Unlike Blackwell, this company existed,
but had been created for the sole purpose of perpetrating the fraud
and did not conduct any legitimate business activities.30 0 This fraud
purportedly netted approximately $300,000, which was also deposited
in overseas accounts.30 1 These allegations led to Harosh's indictment
30 2
on federal charges of wire fraud, securities fraud, and conspiracy.
In contrast to the Weiz case, U.S. authorities declined to
guarantee in advance that Harosh would be returned to Israel to
serve his sentence if convicted. 30 3 Instead, the Israeli government
submitted evidence in support of its contention that Harosh was not30a4
resident of Israel at the time the extradition request was made.
Specifically, the Israeli Attorney General submitted proof that
Harosh had lived in the United States from October 1991 until
August 1998, that he had married a U.S. citizen and had two children
in the United States, that he had made only brief visits to Israel after
1993, and that he had become a permanent resident of the United
States beginning in 1996.305 He left the United States only after his
bank accounts were frozen on August 5, 1998, and lived in Israel less
than a year between his flight from U.S. justice and the submission of
the first extradition request.30 6 Harosh did not testify or submit any
30 7
evidence to the Israeli court.
In opposition to the U.S. extradition request, Harosh made two
primary arguments: that the 1999 amendments did not apply
retroactively to crimes committed prior to their effective date and
that he was a resident of Israel and, therefore, could not be extradited
without an advance guarantee that he would be allowed to serve his
The first of these issues-retroactivity-had
sentence there.3 0 8
received surprisingly little prior treatment in Israeli courts. While
Israel, in keeping with Anglo-American practice, had consistently

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
300.
Id. at 5.
301.
Id.
302.
Id.
303.
Id. at 6.
304.
See id. at 57-60.
305.
Id. at 57-58. The total length of Harosh's visits to Israel after 1996 did not
exceed three weeks. Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
306.
Id. at 60.
307.
308.
Id. at 7-8. Harosh also argued that the district court should not rule on the
U.S. extradition request without taking testimony from him. Id. at 8. The district
court, however, summarily dismissed this argument, holding that nothing had
prevented Harosh from testifying or submitting evidence if he had chosen to do so. Id.
at 10.
298.
299.
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applied extradition treaties retroactively,3 0 9 previous extradition
statutes had generally narrowed rather than expanded the scope of
persons subject to extradition. 310 Accordingly, there had been little
call by the Israeli government to give retroactive effect to newly
enacted extradition laws.
The Supreme Court of Israel, however, had addressed itself to
this matter in the 1972 decision of Hackstater v. State of Israel.3 1 1 In
Hackstater, the Israeli court held that the dual criminality provision
contained in Article 2(2) of the 1954 Extradition Act applied only to
substantive crimes and not to procedural rules.3 12 Thus, as long as
the offense for which extradition was sought was a crime in the
requesting state and in Israel at the time it was committed, a fugitive
could not defeat extradition on the ground that the procedure under
which he was extradited was not then in existence. 3 13 As the court
stated, "[the fugitive's] legal liability for the offense negates any
possible right that might arise in his favor by virtue of the fact that at
the time he committed the offense there was not yet a law, in
accordance with which it was possible to detain him."3 14 In fact, the
Supreme Court of Israel regarded this proposition as "so simple and
self evident that the legislature saw no need at all to state it
'3 15
explicitly.
Accordingly, the Harosh court found little difficulty in applying
the 1999 amendments retroactively. It noted that "extradition law
addresses itself to extradition, that is to say, with a way of
implementing criminal liability, not in determining the criminal
responsibility itself. ' 316 In other words, the amendment to the Israeli
extradition statute did not make criminal an act that was not
previously a crime, but merely provided a method of prosecuting
fugitives for acts that were already illegal when they were committed.

See Elman, supra note 31, at 359-62; see also Cr. A. 557/71, Hackstater v.
309.
State of Israel, 26(1) P.D. 243, 255 (Isr. 1972) (stating that "the fact that the
extradition law or the extradition treaty were not yet in effect at the time [a fugitive]
committed the offense, does not detract from his liability according to the law, and does
not open a door for him to flee from the law"). Because the Hackstater case concerned
the application of a treaty, any pronouncements therein concerning statutory law could
be regarded as dicta; however, they were strongly stated and in accordance with the
practice of other common-law jurisdictions.
310.
See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (describing new restrictions
built into the 1954 Extradition Act); see also supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text
(describing the 1978 prohibition on the extradition of citizens).
311.
Hackstater,26(1) P.D. at 243.
312.
Id. at 252.
313.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 255.
314.
315.
Id. See also id. at 256 (stating that "there is in the law but one clear
directive, that both in the requesting country and in Israel there was law in effect, in
accordance with which the offense was indeed an offense at the time it was
committed").
316.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 12.
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Thus, an extradition statute was not a substantive criminal law but
merely a "procedural norm" that "does not lose its applicability by
virtue of the fact that the offense that is the subject of the extradition
' 317
was committed prior to the enactment of the extradition law."
In addition to citing Hackstater, the Harosh court noted that
retroactive application of extradition statutes was in conformance
with U.S. law3 18 and stated that the Knesset had specifically rejected
a provision that would have restricted the 1999 amendments to
offenses committed after their effective date. 3 19
Thus, while
acknowledging Justice Theodor Or's dicta in Sheinbein that "[t]he
freedom from extradition has been recognized as a basic right in
fundamental law," 320 the court rejected the argument that this "right"
required the application of an ex post facto concept similar to that of
32 1
substantive criminal law.
The court then turned to the standard by which Israeli residency
was to be determined under the 1999 act.3 22 It began this analysis by
noting that "the term 'resident' appears in many laws," but that
different statutes contained varying definitions of the term and some
left it entirely undefined. 323 The court declined to find any of these
definitions controlling, electing instead to construe the term judicially
in light of the overall purpose of the statute. 324 In this vein, it relied
upon a 1978 decision of the Supreme Court of Israel, construing the
term "resident" in the context of a different statute, which noted that
"I do not see much point in such comparisons between laws on
various subjects, because the meaning of the same term can be
different when it appears in different laws, all depending upon the
entire law's content and on its general purpose. ' 325 Accordingly, the
court proceeded to examine both the history of the term "resident" in
326
Israel and the events leading up to the 1999 amendments.
Specifically, the court noted that "[i]nitially the term 'resident'
was identified with the English term 'domicile,"' but that this
interpretation was later abandoned by the Israeli courts. 327 Instead,
"the term 'resident' is a complex one, based on a whole array of

317.

Id. at 12-13.

318.
Id. at 17 (citing 4 MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL AsSISTANCE 76 (1989)).

319.
Id. at 18.
320.
Sheinbein, 53(1) P.D. at 658-59 (opinion of Or, J.).
321.
Harosh, Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, at 19.
322.
Id. at 36-55.
323.
Id. at 36-37.
324.
Id. at 37.
325.
C.A. 657/76 Harashut Hamusmehet Letzora hok Nehey Redifot Hanazim v.
Hasdai, 32(1) P.D. 778, 781 (Isr. 1978).
326.
Harosh, Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99 at 38-42.
327.
Id. at 38 (citing C.A. 587/85, Strak v. State of Israel, 41(3) P.D. 227 (Isr.
1987)).
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connections, both connections existing at present, as well as those
that existed in the past. '328 Moreover, these connections included
"both factual connections . . .as well as emotional connections-the
subjective ones that constitute, in their accretion, the centrality of a
person's life."

329

Both objective and subjective analyses of residency had
previously occurred in Israeli law. In the 1963 decision of Matalon v.
Regional Rabbinical Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo, 3 30 for instance, the
Israeli Supreme Court noted that residency is established by "sincere
and true desire . . .to remain in the new country." 33 ' Some fifteen
years later, the high court likewise held that "the decisive fact ... is
that while (the respondent] . . .did, indeed, depart from the country
for a protracted period of time ... he did so with the actual intention
of returning to it, and this actual intention continued and remained
'3 32
within him during his entire sojourn abroad.
More recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, however,
tended to emphasize objective over subjective connections in
determining whether a person was a resident of Israel. In the 1987
decision of Strak v. State of Israel,3 3 3 for instance, the court held that:
It is not the intention of a person, nor the circumstances that existed in
the past, that determine the place of residence of a person at any given
time. It is, rather, the place to which the person is attached in a
factual-actual-sense.
In other words, the place to which he is
334
connected with the preponderance of factual connections.

This distinction was made even more explicitly in Awad v.
Minister of the Interior,33 5 the decision upon which the Harosh court
relied most heavily in arriving at its own determination.3 3 6 The
petitioner in Awad was an Arab resident of East Jerusalem who had
declined to accept Israeli citizenship following Israel's annexation of
the city in 1967, and instead received a permanent resident's
certificate. 33 7 Subsequently, in 1970, he "left Israel to study in the
United States. . . [and] later obtained a U.S. green card and, in 1978,

328.
Id.
329.
Id. at 38-39.
330.
H.C. 129/63, Matalon v. Reg'] Rabbinical Court of Tel Aviv-Yafo, 17(3) P.D.
1640 (Isr. 1963).
331.
Id. at 1644.
332.
C.A. 657/76, Harashut Hamusmehet Letzora hok Nehey Rechfot Hanazim
v. Hasdai, 32(1) P.D. 778, 781 (Isr. 1987).
333.
C.A. 587/85, Strak v. State of Israel, 41(3) P.D. 227 (Isr. 1988).
334.
Id. at 230.
335.
H.C. 282/88, Awad v. Minister of the Interior, 42(2) P.D. 424 (Isr. 1988).
336.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 52-54.
337.
See David Herling, The Court, the Ministry and the Law: Awad and the
Withdrawal of East Jerusalem Residence Rights, 33 ISR. L. REV. 67, 75 (1999); see also
id. at 71 (noting that Israeli citizenship was offered to the sixty-six thousand Arab
inhabitants of East Jerusalem in 1967, but "it was not and has not been sought by the
great majority").
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U.S. citizenship. '338 He visited Israel only three or four times
between 1970 and 1983, but made more frequent trips to Israel
during the succeeding four years as he became active in the
movement against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza.3 39 In 1987, he applied to renew his Israeli identity card, but
his application was denied on the basis that he had ceased to be a
resident of Israel. 340 In early 1988, the Ministry of the Interior
341
additionally ordered that he be deported from Israel.
Awad challenged both orders on the ground, inter alia, that
342
during his absence from Israel, he had always intended to return.
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, held that intention, in and of
itself, was not controlling, stating that:
It may be that in [Awad's] heart of hearts he sought to return to Israel.
But the decisive criterion is the reality as it actually occurred. Based
on this criterion, at a certain stage the petitioner moved his center of
life to the United States, and he may no longer be viewed as one who
343
resides permanently in Israel.

It was the "center of life" test that the Harosh court, upon analysis of
Chief Justice Barak's dissent in Sheinbein, adopted as relevant to the
344
1999 extradition statute.
The court, however, noted that, although intent was not
controlling as to whether a person's "center of life" was in Israel, it
was nevertheless relevant.3 45 Although a determination of the center
of a person's life rests substantially upon objective facts, the court
found that such facts could be explained or further illuminated by
analysis of the intent with which they were performed. 346 Thus,
"integrat[ion of] the objective and subjective considerations" was
necessary in order to complete the examination of whether Harosh
3 47
was a resident of Israel.

338.
Id. at 75.
339.
Id. at 75-76.
340.
Id. at 75.
341.
Id.
342.
H.C. 282/88, Awad v. Minister of the Interior, 42(2) P.D. 424, 434 (Isr.
1988).
343.
Id.
344.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 42-47. The
Harosh court noted that the Sheinbein decision contained "[a]n exhaustive discourse on
the purpose of the legislation that is the basis of the Extradition Law," and therefore
informed the court's analysis of the meaning of "residency" in the context of extradition
from Israel. Id. at 42.
345.
Id. at 41-42.
346.
Id. at 41; see also id. at 47-51 (discussing relevance of Harosh's intent to
escape U.S. justice to determination of whether his flight to Israel represented an
attempt to establish his center of life there).
347.
Id. at 41-42 (citing C.A. 4127/95, Zelkind v. Beit-Zayit, 52(2) P.D. 306, 321
(Isr. 1998) (stating that "only the integration of objective criteria ... and subjective
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In determining how these facts should be weighed, the district
court relied upon,.two critical factors. First, the court determined
that, although the fact that Harosh had moved to Israel in order to
escape U.S. justice was relevant, it did not by itself establish that his
center of life was outside Israel. 348 The court found this principle to
be consistent both with the legislative intent that those with many
years' residency in Israel be protected notwithstanding an improper
motive for flight 349 and with the prior dicta of the Israeli Supreme
Court that "[olne does not examine too .closely the motives of the one
350
arriving, nor what has motivated him to change his domicile.
Accordingly, although "one who arrives in Israel after having fled the
wrath of justice in his own country of residence may have to bear a
heavier burden in order to prove his residency," this fact was not by
351
itself decisive.
The other determination made by the district court was that a
change of residency takes a substantial amount of time. 35 2 In this

instance, the court again relied heavily upon Awad and upon the
subsequent decision of Zelkind v. Beit-Zayit.35 3 In the latter decision,

the Israeli Supreme Court held that "it 'can be said that the duration
of absence from the fixed place of domicile can serve as a significant
indication ...

and can point to the severance of connection with the

fixed abode. '354 Likewise, in the Awad decision, the high court noted
that "there is certainly a time span during which the focal point of a
person's life hovers, in a sense, between his previous place and his
new place. '355 Thus, although acknowledging the Zelkind court's
dicta that "duration of time cannot' serve as an exclusive and
sufficient gauge" for determining residency, 356 the Harosh court

criteria . . . will aid us in determining whether the condition of permanent living
quarters has been fulfilled")).
348.
See id. at 47-51. The court stated that "one may not view flight from justice

as a reason that, in and of itself, deprives residency in accordance with the Extradition
Law," but that "the consideration of fearful flight from justice to Israel can be taken...
as a factual consideration that can raise doubts about the real intentions ... and may,
by the nature of things, raise the suspicion that the stay in Israel is a temporary one,
until the storm blows over and not later." Id. at 50-51.
349.
Id. at 50-51 (citing remarks of MK Hanan Porat at a hearing before the
Knesset Committee on Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence).
350.
Id. at 50 (quoting Matalon, 17(3) P.D. at 1644). The Matalon court
additionally stated that "[e]ven an improper motive is proper as far as decision on [the]
question [of residency] is concerned, but only if [the petitioner's] true and sincere desire
is to remain in the new country, and not merely to live and reside in it until the storm
has passed." Matalon, 17(3) P.D. at 1644.
351.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 51.
352.
Id. at 52-55.
353.
C.A. 4127/95, Zelkind v. Beit-Zayit, 52(2) P.D. 306 (Kr. 1998).
354.
Id. at 319.
355.
H.C. 282/88, Awad v. Minister of the Interior, 42(2) P.D. 424, 434 (Isr.
1988).
356.
Zelkind, 52(2) P.D. at 320.
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found it to be a critical factor. 357 Specifically, the court found that,
when an Israeli citizen lives abroad, his center of life gradually shifts
away from Israel to the country where he resides. 358 At a certain
point, his status changes from a resident of Israel to a resident of the
he must gradually reforeign country, and, if this point is passed,
3 59
establish his residency upon return to Israel.
The court then applied the law it had made to the facts of
Harosh's case, determining whether Harosh had lost his Israeli
residency during his sojourn in the United States and, if so, whether
he had regained it since his flight from justice. 360 Earlier, the court
had considered the applicable burden of proof and found it to rest
3 61
upon the Israeli government by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court, however, noted that "in a situation in which a negative fact
is involved, and the negative fact is normally known and available to
the defendant, it is sufficient for the accuser to present a scant
quantity of evidence. ''362 Thus, once the Israeli government had met
this burden of producing a minimal amount of evidence showing that
to
Harosh was not a resident of Israel, the burden of proof shifted 363
resident.
a
was
he
that
evidence
with
forward
come
to
Harosh
Moreover, the court noted the long-standing Israeli rule that, in both
from a
civil and criminal cases, an adverse inference could be drawn
364
knowledge.
his
within
facts
about
testify
to
failure
party's
In light of this, the court determined that Harosh's prolonged
absence from Israel, coupled with the fact that he had married a U.S.
citizen and obtained a green card in the United States, meant that
his center of life had shifted to the United States between 1991 and
1998.365 Moreover, the court found that the eleven months that
Harosh had resided in Israel prior to the extradition request were not
sufficient to establish that he had shifted his center of life back to
Israel, especially in light of his failure to present evidence of any
relevant details. 366 Thus, the court concluded that although "at
present there are, in fact, ties connecting the respondent to Israel,
these are insufficient to bestow upon the respondent the status of an
Israeli resident as defined in the Extradition Law." 367 The court
found further support for this conclusion in the fact that Harosh was

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
1981)).
365.
366.
367.

Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 54-55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57-65.
See id. at 21-25, 31-36.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
See id. at 61-62 (citing C.A. 548/79, Sharon v. Levy, 35(1) P.D. 736, 760 (Isr.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59-60, 63.
Id. at 63.
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familiar with the English language and U.S. culture and would thus
not face trial or inprisonment in an unfamiliar environment if he
368
were to be unconditionally extradited to the United States.
It should be noted that the Harosh court's reliance on Awad was
somewhat ironic. The Awad case involved a Palestinian Arab from
East Jerusalem-a class of resident whose rights the Israeli
369
government has frequently been less than willing to protect.
Indeed, the Awad case itself has been criticized as a decision that
opened the door to arbitrary revocations of residence permits for East
Jerusalem Arabs. 3 70 With the Harosh case, a precedent created in
the context of a disfavored group of noncitizens has now been made
applicable to citizens. By relying upon Awad-which was also cited
by Chief Justice Barak in his dissenting opinion in Sheinbein3 71-the
Harosh court stated more clearly than words could express that
Israeli citizens seeking to avoid extradition would likewise be viewed
with disfavor.
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Chaim Berger, a
Hasidic rabbi from New Square, New York was wanted by U.S.
authorities on fraud charges. 372 Berger was born in Hungary in 1926,
emigrated to the United States in 1951, and rose to become the head
of education and religious institutions of the Jewish community in
373
New Square.
Beginning in 1995, the U.S. government began to investigate
Berger and others, in connection with "a massive conspiracy to obtain
by fraud millions of dollars in student financial aid, rental subsidies,
social security benefits and small business loans. '374 The centerpiece
of the scheme consisted of obtaining more than eleven million dollars
in Pell grants through the false enrollment of thousands of New
375
Square residents in nonexistent independent study programs.

368. Id. at 62-63. It should be noted that in a previous article concerning
extradition between the United States and Israel, author Abraham Abramovsky
commented that, if an Israeli court were to determine that a person was an Israeli
citizen but did not enjoy the same legal protection as other citizens, it would be
equivalent to "being half pregnant." See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supranote 6, at 320.
In this respect, the Harosh I decision may qualify as the first Israeli judicial
declaration of half-pregnancy.
369.
See Herling, supra note 337, at 99-105 (discussing arbitrary non-renewals
of East Jerusalem identity cards by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior).
370. Id. at 90-91 (citing Shqaqi v. Minister of the Interior, 95 (2) Takdin Elyon
1614).
371.
See Sheinbein, 53(1) P.D. at 638-39 (Barak, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2000) (Berger
372.

III).
373.
See Cr. A. 2600/00, Berger v. Attorney General, slip op. at 1-2 (Isr. 2000)
(Berger II).
374.
Berger II, 224 F.3d at 111.
Pell grants are scholarships provided by the U.S.
375.
Id. at 111-12.
government to needy students. Id. See also Benjamin Weiser, 6 Indicted in Fraud
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During the investigation, Berger's attorneys engaged in active plea
negotiations with U.S. prosecutors and specifically informed them
that Berger did not intend to flee the United States. 3 76 Specifically,
they "pointed out that Berger had resided in New Square for decades
resided in New Square and
and that his children and grandchildren
'377
its immediate neighborhoods."
During this time, however, Berger was exploring the option of
emigrating to Israel. 378 During a visit to Israel in 1996 on the
occasion of a grandchild's wedding, he "attempted to obtain
documentation as a newly arrived immigrant but returned to the
United States. '379 Subsequently, in February 1997, he again arrived
in Israel and succeeded in obtaining citizenship pursuant to the Law
of Return. 380 In addition, he obtained housing as a new immigrant,
registered for national health care benefits, and voted in the 1999
3 81
Israeli elections.
On May 28, 1997, Berger was named in a federal indictment on
the fraud charges in the Southern District of New York. 382 Shortly
thereafter, he failed to appear in court for arraignment upon the
indictment. 383 On July 8, 1998, U.S. authorities requested his
extradition from Israel, and he was arrested *in Jerusalem on
Berger had never
February 28, 1999.384 Prior to being indicted,
385
resided in Israel or held Israeli citizenship.
In light of this, the district court, like that in Harosh, held that
Berger had not acquired Israeli residency during his twenty month
sojourn in Israel. 38 6 Specifically, the court noted that:
The Extradition Law was not intended to provide a fugitive from
justice, who has lived for 71 years outside of Israel, since his birth...
the benefit of serving his sentence in Israel, a benefit the legislators
intended to grant to a citizen who is a resident with a real connection to
Israel, who has manifested his desire to live permanently in Israel, and

Over Use of Grants for Hasidic Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1997, at Al (describing
the scheme perpetrated by Berger and his co-defendants).
Berger II, Cr. A. 2600/00, slip op. at 2.
376.
Id.
377.
378.
Id.
Id.
379.
Id.
380.
Id.
381.
Id.
382.
2 Accused of Fraud Fail to Appear in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 6, 1997, at
383.
B7.
384.
Berger v. Attorney General, slip op. at 2. See also Randal C. Archibold, 4
Who Got Leniency Defrauded U.S. for Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at Bi.
385.

B.S. 2140/99, Attorney General v. Berger, slip op. at 21,

(Or, J.) (Berger I).
Id.
386.

110 (Jan. 2000)
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has done so without any connection to his fearful flight from justice in a
387
country that has served as his permanent residence for decades.

Both Harosh and Berger appealed, and their cases were decided
by the Israeli Supreme Court on the same day.38 8 In the Harosh case,
the three judge panel unanimously affirmed the "thorough and
comprehensive" decision of the district court, based largely on its
reasoning. 389 In fact, the Supreme Court examined the question of
residency largely as an afterthought, concurring in the district court's
reliance on the Awad decision and its "center of life" test.3 90 The
court also concurred in the district court's analysis of the retroactivity
issue, with the additional comment that Harosh had not acquired a
"vested right" in nonextradition when he returned to Israel prior to
the adoption of the new law.3 91 Specifically, the court noted that "one
cannot assume that the previous law created expectations (surely
unreasonable ones) in Israeli citizens that they can commit
extraditable offenses outside of Israel, and would then always be able
392
to flee to Israel.
In one important departure from the district court's reasoning,
however, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the 1999
amendment could not be retroactively applied to Israeli citizens
whose extradition had previously been sought unsuccessfully by the
United States. 39 3 This statement seems likely to foreclose any
renewed application to extradite either Sheinbein himself or any
other Israeli whose extradition was sought and denied under the 1978
statute. Moreover, this reasoning represents a significant departure
from standard common-law practice in both the United States and
the Commonwealth, under which multiple requests for extradition
may be made even if the same person was previously found
3 94
nonextraditable under a prior law.

Id.
387.
388.
Cr. A. 3025/00, Harosh v. State of Israel, slip op. at 27 (Isr. 2000) (Harosh
II). See also Berger II, at 6; Dan Izenberg, Supreme Court Rules Two Can be
Extradited to U.S., JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 16, 2000, at 5 (stating that the decisions
were rendered simultaneously).
389.
Harosh II, Cr. A. 3025/00, slip op. at 4.
390.
Id. at 23-29.
391.
Id. at 17-23.
392.
Id. at 21. The court also noted that any presumption in favor of a vested
right of nonextradition is overcome by the countervailing interest of the Israeli
government in cooperating with other nations to fight crime. Id. at 18-20.
393.
Id. at 16.
394.
For the U.S. position, see Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1923)
(holding that double jeopardy does not apply to extradition proceedings); see also In re
Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that fugitive could be
extradited to West Germany despite denial of previous request); In re Extradition of
McMullen, 989 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that extradition law targeted at
accused IRA bombers whose extradition had previously been unsuccessfully sought
could be applied retroactively and was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder). For
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With respect to residency, the Supreme Court agreed with the
court below that Harosh's center of life had moved to the United
States during his absence from Israel and that he had not reestablished residency during the short period of his return.3 95 The
court also concurred in the district court's opinion that flight from
justice, by itself, did not preclude a finding that a fugitive was a
resident of Israel, but agreed that Harosh had not re-established
residency even with the benefit of this presumption. 396 Specifically,
although "Harosh began a process of integration into the life of
Israel," that process "ha[d] not yet been completed" at the time the
397
extradition request was made.
In addition to its determination of Harosh's extraditability, the
court made a number of other statements in dicta for the guidance of
future courts. For instance, the court made clear that a short absence
from Israel would not result in the loss of residency and would thus
not shift the burden to the fugitive to demonstrate that residency had
been re-established. 398 In addition, the Supreme Court declined to
uncritically accept the district court's finding that the applicable
burden of proof in establishing nonresidency was preponderance of
the evidence, suggesting that "the criminal character of the
extradition process" might require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 99 The exact conditions required for an Israeli citizen to lose
his status as resident, however, were left for another day, as was a
40 0
final determination of the applicable burden of proof.

the Commonwealth position, see In re Lind and Sweden, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 181, 191
(Ontario High Ct. 1985) (allowing extradition of fugitive to Sweden under amended
statute, despite denial of previous request under former law); see also Dutton v.
Republic of South Africa, 1999 Aust. Fed. Ct. LEXIS 1 (Aust. Fed. Ct. 1999) (allowing
extradition of fugitive to South Africa under amended statute, despite denial of
previous request under former law). Curiously, though, the Harosh 11 court's position
is not without precedent in Israeli history, as an 1934 extradition agreement between
the British Mandatory authorities and the government of the Transjordan provided
that "cases in respect of which an extradition request has already been made and
refused by the competent authorities shall not be included" in its retroactive
application. Extradition Agreement, Pal.-Transjordan, art. 9, reprinted at Supplement
2 to Palestine Gazette No. 455 (July 26, 1934). This agreement was not cited as
precedent by the Harosh 11 court.
395.
Cr. A. 3025/00, Harosh v. State of Israel, slip op. at 28-29. Harosh was
subsequently extradited to the United States and arrived in New York on January 5,
2001, becoming the first native-born Israeli citizen to be extradited from Israel. For the
First Tine, Israel Extraditesa Citizen, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 5, 2001.
396.
Harosh II, Cr. A. 3025/00 at 27, 29.
397.
Id. at 29.
398.
Id. at 26 (stating that "[an Israeli student who studies outside of Israel
does not, in and of itself, negate his residency").
399.
Id. at 30.
400.
See id. The court found it unnecessary to determine the applicable burden
of proof because it held that Harosh had failed to establish residency under either a
preponderance or a reasonable doubt standard. Id.
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In the Berger case, the decision of the district court was likewise
affirmed. 40 1 While noting that the relevant date for determining
residency was the date of the judicial application for extradition in
February 1999 rather than the date extradition was first requested
by U.S. authorities in July 1998,402 the court held that Berger had not
remained in Israel long enough to qualify as a resident.40 3 The
majority opinion noted that:
More meaningful ties are needed from both a period of time and other
factors before the center of Berger's life could pass from the United
States-where he resided for more than 45 years, wherein his children
and grandchildren are present and where his congregation is present
and with whom he is inextricably tied-before the center of his life
40 4
could pass to Israel.

While agreeing that "the fact of fleeing from prosecution in and of
itself' was not enough to warrant a conclusion that Berger was not an
Israeli resident, this fact "[swung] the scales greatly in favor of a
temporary stay or a stay until the storm is over. '40 5 In light of this,
the "first steps" that Berger had taken toward establishing Israeli
40 6
residency were not enough to shift the center of his life.
This holding, however, was challenged by a dissent from Justice
Levin. 407 Despite the fact that Berger had never been an Israeli
citizen or resided in Israel prior to fleeing, Justice Levin argued that
he had proven that it was common for Hasidic rabbis to retire to
Israel.4 0 8 Specifically, he noted that: "Berger... proved that it is the
practice amongst the elders of his community to immigrate to Israel
at the end of their life in order to reside in Israel. This fact is true
whether or not the investigation against him persuaded Berger to
hasten his emigration." 40 9 Accordingly, he asserted that there was

401.
Cr. A. 2600/00, Berger v. Attorney General, slip op. at 3-4.
402.
Id. at 3.
403.
Id.
404.
Id.
405.
Id. at 4.
406.
Id. It should be noted that the dispute over Berger's Israeli residency was
not the only controversial aspect of his case, as he and three co-defendants were among
those who received commutations of their sentences on President Bill Clinton's last day
in office. See Ward Harkavy, Hillary Gets Fitted for a New Mouthpiece, VILLAGE
VOICE, Jan. 31, 2001.
407.
Cr. A. 2600/00, Berger v. Attorney General, slip op. at 4-6 (Levin, J.,
dissenting).
408.
Id. at 5-6.
409.
Id. at 6. Justice Levin also stated that his conclusion as to Berger's
residency "gain[ed] strength" from the fact that he registered as an immigrant to Israel
and thus became a "resident" within the terms of the Israeli census law. Id. In
addition, he noted that the Knesset was considering an amendment to shift the
significant date for determining residency from the date of the extradition request to
the date of the offense, thus indicating that the 1999 amendment did not intend to
preclude fugitives from establishing residency. Id.
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sufficient evidence to determine that Berger had moved to Israel
410
permanently rather than simply "until the storm blows over."
In addition to Harosh and Berger, two other extradition requests
under the new law have resulted in determinations of extraditability
by Israeli district courts. 4 11 The first of these is the case of Daniel
Krasnick, an attorney indicted in Suffolk County, New York in 1997
on charges of embezzling $103,000 from a cooperative apartment
corporation. 4 12 After his law license was suspended by the Appellate
Division, First Department in February 1998, Krasnick fled to Israel
and acquired citizenship. 413 He, however, stayed in Israel for just
five months before leaving for Italy, remaining there until September
1999 when he returned to Israel. 4 14 On July 20, 2000, the Jerusalem
District Court held that these brief sojourns in Israel did not qualify
him as a resident under the Extradition Law and declared him
unconditionally extraditable. 41 5 Krasnick chose not to appeal and
was returned to the United States, thus becoming the first Israeli
citizen actually extradited under the new law. 4 16 Subsequently, he
entered a guilty plea to larceny in the Suffolk County Court and was
417
sentenced to one year imprisonment.
A similar result was reached in the case of Gennady Yagudaev,
418
who is likely to become the first Israeli citizen extradited to Russia.
Yagudaev, who was sentenced to thirteen years in prison by a
Russian court in 1983, escaped from prison in 1992 after serving nine
Subsequently, in November 1996, he
years of his sentence. 419

410.
See id.; see also Cr. A. 3025/00, Harosh v. State of Israel, slip op. at 32-33
(Levin, J., concurring) (explaining his dissent in Berger II and differentiating it from
the facts of the Harosh case). Subsequent to the Supreme Court ruling, Berger also
drew support from other quarters. MK Shimel Halpert of the United Torah Judaism
party, for instance, unsuccessfully introduced a bill that would have exempted anyone
over age seventy from extradition. See Nina Gilbert & Dan Izenberg, Sheetrit appeals
'Berger law' vote, JERUSALEM POST, June 28, 2001, at 4. Berger was also successful in
seeking a rehearing by an extended panel of seven Supreme Court justices, but this
panel ruled against him by a vote of 4-3. See Dan Izenberg, Berger's appeal rejected
paving way for US extradition, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 6, 2001, at 1. On August 7,
2001, Berger was returned to the United States, where he was arraigned and held
without bail. See Devlin Barrett, Pardon-CaseFugitive Denied Bail, N.Y. POST, Aug. 8,
2001, at 13.
411.
James Bernstein, Lawyer Ordered to Return to U.S., NEWSDAY (New York),
July 25, 2000, at A8; Dan Izenberg, Court allows first extradition to Russia,JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 22, 2000, at 6A.
412.
Bernstein, supranote 411, at A8.
413.
Id. Krasnick was ultimately disbarred due to his failure to respond to the
disciplinary proceeding. In re Krasnick, 684 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
414.
Bernstein, supra note 411, at A8.
415.
Id.
416.
Id.
417.
Interview with Mark Cohen, Suffolk Co. Assistant District Attorney (June
30, 2001).
418.
See Izenberg, supra note 411, at 6A.
419.
Id.
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emigrated to Israel, claiming falsely that he was single and had no
criminal record. 420 His stay in Israel was apparently intermittent
and punctuated by frequent returns to Russia; during one of these
visits in November 1998, he was involved in a kidnapping for
ransom. 421 On September 22, 2000, the Jerusalem District Court
found that he was unconditionally extraditable on both counts, as his
off
intermittent residence in Israel was not enough to "cut himself
' 4 22
from his homeland and... become involved in daily life in Israel.
The case of Rachamim Anatian, a rabbi sought by the United
States in connection with an alleged fraud on the Coutts bank in
England, 423 has not yet been decided in the Israeli courts, but is
unlikely to present any difficult issues. Anatian, who was born in the
United States and lived in Brooklyn at the time the offense was
allegedly committed, emigrated to Israel only in 1999.424 Because his
extradition from Israel was requested little more than a year later, 42 5
it is unlikely that he will be found to have established Israeli
residency.
The case of Dov Engel, however, presented far more difficult
Engel, a fifty-two-year-old Brooklyn
issues of residency.
businessman, was charged in the Eastern District of New York with
defrauding several banks of amounts totaling $115 million. 426 After
the scheme began to unravel in September 1997, Engel fled to Israel
and became an Israeli citizen. 4 27 Because U.S. authorities did not
request his extradition until September 2000, he had resided

420.
Id.
421.
Id.
Id. Curiously, under the Israeli Nationality Law, a person who acquires
422.
Israeli citizenship by naturalization may be deprived of his citizenship for fraud in the
application process, but a Jew who emigrates under the Law of Return may not. See
Nationality Law, § 11(a)(1), 6 L.S.I. 50, 52 (1952) (stating that "a person having
acquired Israel nationality by naturalization" may be deprived of citizenship obtained
under false particulars); see also id. §§ 2, 5, 6 L.S.I. at 50-51 (distinguishing between
Israelis who obtain citizenship under the Law of Return and those who become citizens
through naturalization). Neither the Nationality Law nor the Law of Return itself
contain any similar provisions with respect to Israelis who immigrated as olim. Id.
See also Law of Return, 4 L.S.I. 114. Accordingly, Yagudaev's extraditability was
apparently dependent upon his Israeli residency, as neither the government nor the
court could make him extraditable by stripping him of his citizenship.
423.
Patrick Weever, Queen's Bank at Centre of InternationalFraud Trial, THE
TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 2000, at 1.
424.
Paul Beckett, Prosecutorsare ProbingBritain's Coutts Loans to U.S. Client,
WALL ST. J., July 28, 1999, at B12.
425.
See Weever, supra note 423, at 1 (noting that Anatian's extradition had
been requested prior to September 2000).
426.
Mike Claffey, Fugitive Bizman is Busted in Israel, DAILY NEWS (Suburban
Section), Sept. 1, 2000, at 1.
Pete Bowles, FraudCharges Reach Abroad, NEWSDAY, Sept. 1, 2000, at A3.
427.
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continuously in Israel for three years at the time the request was
42 8
made.
Initially, the Israeli Attorney General, at the request of U.S.
authorities, proceeded against Engel as a nonresident. As it became
clear that Engel could make a strong argument in favor of residency,
however, U.S. and Israeli authorities agreed to allow Engel to serve
429
his sentence in Israel on condition that he consent to extradition.
Accordingly, on March 26, 2001, the Jerusalem District Court entered
judgment against Engel declaring that he was extraditable but that
"he [would] not be extradited ... until the United States agrees that
'430
he will be returned to serve his sentence in Israel if convicted.
The advantage obtained by Engel from his flight to Israel was
brought home dramatically at his sentencing on December 3, 2001.
Under U.S. sentencing guidelines, he was eligible for a sentence of
In Israel, however, the
more than eleven years in prison. 431
maximum sentence for bank fraud is five years, and Engel would
serve no more than the amount of time under Israeli law. 432 The
sentencing judge expressed her exasperation, stating that Engel
"knew that [the United States] couldn't touch him" in Israel and that
she was "sentencing [him] as if he would serve his time in the U.S.,"
but these were futile gestures. 43 3 The inescapable fact was that, by
fleeing to Israel and taking advantage of the 1999 act, Engel
unilaterally reduced his sentence by more than half.
The Engel case, like the Weiz case before it, revealed the
weaknesses of the new Israeli extradition law. As in Engel, difficult
questions might have arisen if the residency of Daniel Weiz had been
contested in the courts. Weiz, although born in Israel, had moved
with his parents to Canada at the age of twelve, nearly seven years
before the Baranovsky murder, and had lived in Israel only
intermittently since then. 434 In fact, Weiz' only significant period of
Israeli residency since 1992 took place during the six months between
February and August 1999, after he jumped bail on assault and
robbery charges in Canada. 435 Moreover, after obtaining a month's

428.
Id.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 1732/00, Attorney General v. Engel, slip op. at 2 (Zur, J.). See
429.
also Israeli Extraditedto U.S. for Fraud Trial,JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 27, 2001 (stating
that prosecutors had reached an agreement with Engel under which he would be
allowed to serve his sentence in Israel on condition that he did not appeal against
extradition to the Israeli Supreme Court).
430.
Engel, Cr. C. (B.S.) 1732/00 at 2.
431.
See Karen Freifeld, IsraeliLaw Cuts Sentence for $115M Fraud, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 4, 2001, at A12.
See id.
432.
See id.
433.
Attorney General v. Weiz, (Decision on Bail Application) (unreported) (Jm.
434.
Feb. 2, 2000) (Arad, J.).
435.
Id.
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leave from the Israeli military in August 1999, Weiz overstayed his
justice system,
leave, settled accounts with the Canadian criminal
436
and returned to his parents' home in Toronto.
Nevertheless, during Weiz' brief sojourn in Israel, he had
undertaken one of the most fundamental expressions of citizenshipservice in the Israeli military. In addition, Weiz rejoined his military
unit after returning to Israel in November 1999 and remained in
active service until he was arrested at the request of the Canadian
authorities. 437 Thus, had the Israeli government attempted to
commence extradition proceedings against Weiz as a nonresident, it
would have been in the potentially uncomfortable position of arguing
that an active-duty member of its military was not entitled to the
protection of Israeli law. Given the previous dicta of the Israeli
Supreme Court that "it may be that after a short absence it would be
possible, under certain circumstances, to obtain a sharp severance of
connection to the [former] domicile," 438 Weiz might have persuasively
argued that his induction into the Israeli military accomplished just
that.
The capitulation of the prosecutors in the Engel case, however, is
even more illustrative of the weaknesses of the new statute. With the
concession of Engel's residency status, he became the second person,
after Sheinbein, who had no connection to Israel at the time of his
offense but who nevertheless obtained the protection of Israeli law.
Moreover, at the time he committed his offense, Engel did not even
have the technical Israeli nationality that Sheinbein was able to
claim. 439 Thus, the assertion of Israeli diplomat Lenny Ben-David
that there would be "no more Sheinbeins" under the new law has
440
been proven untrue.
IV. No MORE SHEINBEINS: FURTHER REFORM OF THE EXTRADITION

ACT
The Extradition Act (Amendment No. 6) of 1999 represents an
attempt by Israel to substantially modify its extradition laws and
Like prior Israeli extradition legislation, the 1999
practices.
amendment is an attempt to balance Israel's humanitarian interest

436.
Id.
437.
Id.
438.
C.A. 4127/95, Zelkind v. Beit-Zayit, 52(2) P.D. 306, 319-20 (Isr. 1998). It is
also noteworthy that at least one Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court apparently
believes that an indicted fugitive's inability to return to the United States "makes his
commitment to the move to Israel all the greater." See Izenberg, supra note 411, at 6A
(quoting Israeli Sup. Ct. Justice Dalia Dorner).
439.
See Bowles, supra note 427, at A3.
440.
Ben-David, supra note 16, at A16.
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in protecting its bona fide nationals with its responsibility to
cooperate with other nations in the fight against international crime.
Aware of the shortcomings of both the traditional common-law
approach and the absolute Continental prohibition against the
sought to emulate the mixed
extradition of nationals, the Knesset
44 1
approach of the Netherlands.
In addition, the Knesset recognized that a significant proportion
of Israeli nationals do not have strong connections to Israel, either
because they are relatively recent arrivals who have not yet shifted
the center of their lives to Israel or because they are yordimemigres-who have long since shifted the center of their lives
This point was graphically brought home to Israeli
away.44 2
lawmakers by the case of Samuel Sheinbein, a nonresident citizen
who manipulated the Israeli legal system to his own gain and to the
Accordingly, the
detriment of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. 443
Knesset took the unprecedented step of dividing Israeli citizens into
444
residents and nonresidents.
The 1999 law, however, does not foreclose the possibility of
future manipulation of the Israeli extradition system, either by new
immigrants or by long-departed yordim. As the cases of Sharon
Harosh and Chaim Berger demonstrate, both yordim and olim who
claim to be residents of Israel can litigate the merits of their claims
and obtain serious consideration in the Israeli courts, with Berger
445
obtaining the support of one Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel.
Accordingly, the possibility exists that future cases similar to
Sheinbein's will strain U.S.-Israeli relations and further reform of the
Israeli extradition process is thus necessary in order to achieve the
balance that Israel desires.
Any analysis of the prospects for reform of the Israeli extradition
law, however, must take into account the political forces that shaped
the 1999 amendments, as any attempt at reform will likely encounter
the same forces. Moreover, the weaknesses of the 1999 statute have
not yet been fully illustrated by actual cases, so Israeli lawmakers
may not be fully aware of the potential difficulties that may flow from
application of the new law. Accordingly, this section will analyze
both the forces that gave rise to the 1999 statute as well as potential
worst-case scenarios before making recommendations for reform.
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A. Why Did Israel Separate Its Citizens Into Classes?
In the 1999 extradition law, Israel did what no other country in
the world has done-divided its citizens into two classes for
extradition purposes. 446 No longer are fugitives in Israel divided into
citizens and noncitizens. Now, it is possible to be a citizen but not a
resident-which is equivalent, for extradition purposes, to not being a
447
citizen at all.
In examining the reasons behind this unprecedented measure, it
must be remembered that the 1999 law was passed in reaction to the
Sheinbein case and was intended to prevent a repetition of the abuse
of Israeli citizenship perpetrated by Sheinbein. 448 The law itself,
however, was as much at fault for this abuse as Samuel Sheinbein.
By allowing Jewish immigrants to obtain immediate citizenship,
permitting dual citizenship, and prohibiting renunciation without the
consent of the Ministry of the Interior, this statute allows many who
have little if any connection to Israel to claim that they are
449
citizens.
Thus, in order to prevent the Sheinbein case from recurring,
Israel was faced with three alternatives. First, it could restrict its
citizenship law by providing, for example, that persons who become
citizens or permanent residents of another country could not also be
citizens of Israel. Likewise, Israel could have replaced the Law of
Return with a naturalization process similar to that of most other
nations. 450 This alternative, however, would infringe on the broad
conception of Israeli citizenship, which stems from the idea of Israel
as a nation of refuge. 451 If Israel is to provide protection to Jews who
claim its shelter, then Israeli citizenship must be something that can
never be forfeited. 452 Thus, restricting the citizenship law was not a
palatable alternative to the Knesset.
Second, the Israelis could have eliminated all distinctions
between citizens and noncitizens with respect to extradition and
agreed to extradite all citizens without conditions. This alternative,
however, would also conflict with the concept of Israel as a nation of
refuge, as well as with the additional humanitarian principle that
persons should be imprisoned in their own country if possible. If
Israel had changed the law to make citizens unconditionally
extraditable, then people who had spent their entire lives in Israel,

446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

See supra notes 256-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 269-79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
See Shachar, supra note 23, at 240.
Id. at 264-65.
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and had known no other country, might have faced long prison
sentences away from their homeland and families. Such persons
would also have faced the distinct possibility of anti-Semitic acts by
to
other inmates or prison officials, which would be antithetical
453
Israel's historical role of protecting Jews from anti-Semitism.
Moreover, although Israeli citizens who were unconditionally
extradited would still be eligible for repatriation under the provisions
of the Strasbourg Convention, 4 54 there would be no guarantee that
this would happen. In fact, repatriation would be unlikely in many
cases, especially where Israelis were extradited to the United
States. 45 5 While prisoner transfers are rapidly becoming an accepted
norm in Europe, 456 this is not the case in the United States, where
retribution rather than rehabilitation is often the driving force in
sentencing decisions. 457 In the U.S. criminal justice system, and to a
lesser extent the Canadian one, 458 it is more important that prisoners
are punished in the jurisdiction where their crimes are committed
459
than that they be rehabilitated within their own culture.
Therefore, if Israel allowed its citizens to be extradited
unconditionally, it is likely that a significant number of them would
not be returned to serve their sentences.
Such cases would constitute the reverse of the Sheinbein case.
Instead of fugitives with little or no connection to Israel claiming the
protection of Israeli law, Israelis with a similarly tenuous connection
to a foreign state might find themselves at the mercy of its prison
system. 460 This was the condition that was unacceptable to the
46 1
Knesset Committee on Constitution, Law and Jurisprudence.

See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
453.
454.
Cr. A. 3025/00, Harosh v. State of Israel, slip op. at 31 (noting that, even
though the U.S. government had not agreed in advance to allow Harosh to serve his
sentence in Israel, nothing prevented him from being repatriated after sentence at the
discretion of the United States).
See David S. Finkelstein, Ever Been in a [Foreign] Prison? The
455.
Implementation of Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties by U.S. States, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 125, 136 (1997) (noting barriers to the regular use of penal transfer treaties by
the United States).
Yaffa Zilbershats, Extraditing Israeli Citizens to the United States456.
Extradition and Citizenship Dilemmas, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 297, 305 (2000) (describing
repatriation of prisoners as a "developing trend" that has gained wide acceptance in
Europe).
457.
See Finkelstein, supra note 455, at 159 (noting that considerations of
retribution impede acceptance and use of prisoner transfer treaties).
See Dan Izenberg, Murder in Toronto's Jewish Community Shakes the City,
458.
JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 24, 2000, at 6B (discussing Canadian criticism of repatriation
as a condition of Weiz' extradition to stand trial in Toronto).
See Finkelstein, supra note 455, at 159.
459.
Cr. A. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 56 (citing
460.
remarks of MK Hanan Porat during proceedings of Committee on Constitution, Law
and Jurisprudence).
See id.
461.
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Thus, in its effort to eliminate the possibility of another Sheinbein
case, Israel was apparently not willing to go to the other extreme.
That left the third alternative-to distinguish between classes of
citizens, as Judge Barak and MK Rubinstein had suggested. 462 By
doing so, however, Israel may have painted itself into another corner.
Specifically, as made clear by the remarks of MK Hanan Porat, the
addition of "residency" as a qualification for protection under the
extradition law forced Israel to change the relevant time from the
date the crime was committed to the date of the extradition
request. 4 63 Otherwise, if significant delay resulted between the
commission of the offense and the extradition request, certain bona
to extended
fide citizens and residents of Israel would be subject
4 64
imprisonment away from their homes and families.

B. Sheinbeins in Waiting: Delayed Extradition and Residency
This focus on the date of the extradition request, however,
carries its own difficulties. Specifically, it opens the protection of
Israeli law even to persons who were not Israeli citizens at the time
they committed offenses in other countries, provided only that they
become Israeli citizens and remain in Israel long enough to qualify as
residents. 465 Prior to 1999, such persons were clearly not entitled to
protection from extradition to any degree. 466 Now, however, they
may seek protection, at least to the extent of being allowed to serve
their sentences in Israel, by claiming that they have become resident
467
citizens.
Such extended delays in the extradition process are not
unprecedented, especially where the investigation is complex and
time-consuming. 468 As discussed above, Dov Engel resided in Israel
469
for three years before the United States requested his extradition.

462.
See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Barak's
proposed categorization of Israeli citizens for extradition purposes); see also supra note
273 and accompanying text (discussing MK Amnon Rubinstein's proposal to require
Israeli residency for one year as a condition of nonextraditability).
Harosh, Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99 at 56.
463.
Id. See also id. at 50-51 (discussing the reasons why the date of the
464.
extradition request was selected as the relevant date for determining residency).
Cr. A. 3025/00, Harosh v. State of Israel, slip op. at 25 (reaffirming that
465.
flight from justice does not by itself establish that a fugitive is not an Israeli resident
provided that the other necessary conditions are met).
See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 158-59 and
466.
accompanying text.

467.
See supra notes 426-33 and accompanying text (describing the Dov Engel
case).
See Charles Bremner, Italy Block Agreement on Europe Warrant, TIMES
468.
(London), Dec. 7, 2001, at 11 (discussing delays which often accompany extradition
process).
See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
469.
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elapsed between the date of
In the case of Isaac Kirman, a full47decade
0
the offense and his trial in Israel.
The case of Robert Manning, also involving a decade-long delay,
provides perhaps the most graphic illustration of the way the 1999
act could be abused. Manning, a member of the radical Jewish
Defense League who was accused in the 1980 letter-bomb murder of
Patricia Wilkerson in California, became an Israeli citizen and took
up permanent residence in Israel during 1981.471 Subsequently,
Manning was also accused in the 1985 letter-bomb killing of Arab472
American activist Alex Odeh.
Due to administrative delay, however, the United States did not
request Manning's extradition from Israel until 1991. 47 3 Under the
1978 statute, Manning could not be extradited for the Odeh killing
because it had been committed after he acquired Israeli citizenship,
474
but he was unconditionally extraditable for the 1980 murder.
Accordingly, he was returned to the United States in 1993, convicted
in federal court, and sentenced to life without parole in a U.S.
4 75
prison.
Under the new law, however, Manning-who resided in Israel for
ten years before U.S. authorities requested his extradition-would
not be extraditable unless the United States undertook in advance to
allow him to serve his sentence in Israel. 476 This is because, having
lived continuously in Israel for such a long period before the
submission of the extradition request, he could have meritoriously
claimed that Israel was now the center of his life. Thus, the Manning
case illustrates how the 1999 law has the potential to create
diplomatic difficulties similar or equivalent to the Sheinbein case.
Even under the Offences Committed Abroad Act, the Manning
investigation caused considerable friction between Israeli and U.S.
law enforcement officials. 477 U.S. authorities accused Israel of
dragging its feet in processing the extradition request, 478 and the
United States was finally forced to agree to prosecute Manning for
only one of the two murders of which he was suspected. 479 Had the

470.
471.

See Cohen, supra note 151, at 599-605.
See Tom Tugend, JDL Member Gets Life Term in Bombing, JEWISH

TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, June 16, 1995.

472.
See Gordon Dillow, Mail-Bombing Suspect a Man of Many Faces, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at B1.
See United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1995).
473.
474.
Michael Hedges, Bomb Suspect Finally Faces Trial: Arab-Americans, FBI
Say Israel Stalled Extradition,WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at Al.
See Tugend, supra note 471. Manning's wife Rochelle was also sought for
475.
extradition to the United States, but she died of a heart attack in an Israeli prison
before she could be returned. Id.
476.
See Extradition Act (Amend. No. 6) § 1(A)(1) (Isr. 1999).
See Hedges, supra note 474, at Al.
477.
478.

Id.

479.

See Tugend, supra note 471.
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1999 law been in effect, the United States may well have had to agree
to yet another condition-that Manning be returned to Israel to serve
his sentence in the event of conviction. In other words, Manning-who was a U.S. citizen and had lived in Israel only after becoming a
fugitive from justice-would have been entitled to the protection of
Israeli law.
Moreover, such protection would have benefitted Manning and
prejudiced the United States. Specifically, under Israeli domestic
law, prisoner transfers must be effected pursuant to the terms of
either a multilateral or bilateral convention or to a special agreement
between Israel and the sentencing state. 48 0 Thus, a prisoner transfer
between Israel and the United States would be effected either under
the terms of the Strasbourg Convention or those of an agreement
between U.S. and Israeli authorities in that particular case. 48 1 In
either event, it is likely that Manning would have served a shorter
48 2
sentence in Israel than was imposed in the United States.
If an Israeli national sentenced to imprisonment in the United
States is transferred under the Strasbourg Convention, Israel would
be entitled either to continue the enforcement of the U.S. sentence or
to convert it into a judgment under Israeli law. 483 If Israel chooses
the latter course, then the sanction would be determined exclusively
by the Israeli penal code and parole regulations and would not be
subject to any minimum sentence provided by U.S. law. 48 4 Thus,
Israel would be entitled to parole the transferred prisoner according
to its own law-and, under the terms of the Convention, the United
States would be specifically forbidden from "enforc[ing] the sentence
if the administering State considers enforcement of the sentence to
have been completed. 4 8 5

480.
See Law Transferring Prisoners to Their Own Country, 1996 S.H. 1603, § 3,
as amended, 1999 S.H. 1720. A special agreement is "a specific agreement between the
two countries concerning the transfer of a particular prisoner." Id.
See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (noting that Israel is a party
481.
to the Strasbourg Convention). The United States ratified the Strasbourg Convention
on March 11, 1985. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983,
22 I.L.M. 530, ratified by United States, Mar. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 929 (1984).
See Penal Code 1977, § 41, 251 Special Vol. (Isr. 1977) (stating that, under
482.
ordinary circumstances, the maximum prison sentence provided for by Israeli law is
twenty years).
483.
See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 224, art. 9(1); see also Law
Transferring Prisoners to Their Own Country, 1996 S.H. 1603, § 10(a)(1), as amended,
1999 S.H. 1720 (stating that an Israeli court could reduce a foreign sentence to the
maximum provided by Israeli law if the agreement governing prisoner transfers
between Israel and the sentencing state permitted); id. § 14(8)(a)(ii) (stating that a
foreign sentence more severe than the maximum permitted under Israeli law must be
reduced to the maximum that would be allowed if the prisoner had been sentenced in
Israel).
484.
See Strasbourg Convention, supra note 224, art. 11(1)(d).
485.
Id. art. 8(2). See also Law Transferring Prisoners to Their Own Country,
1996 S.H. 1603, § 11, as amended, 1999 S.H. 1720.
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Nor would the safeguards normally available under the
Convention to protect the integrity of the U.S. sentence be available
in a case such as Manning's.. In the ordinary prisoner transfer
situation that is governed by the Convention, the prisoner is in the
custody of the sentencing state, that is thus in a position to demand
that enforcement of its sentence be continued as a condition of
transfer. 486 Under the 1999 amendment to the Israeli extradition
law, however, the arrangements for transfer must be made in
48 7
advance of extradition while the fugitive is in Israeli custody.
Accordingly, it would be Israel rather than the United States that
would be in a position to dictate the conditions under which the
488
sentence would be enforced.
The same factors would apply if Manning were returned to Israel
pursuant to a special agreement between Israel and the United
States. 48 9 Because Israel would have custody of Manning and would
be able to control the terms of his extradition, it is likely that Israeli
authorities would reserve the power to review and reduce his
sentence and to parole him according to Israeli law. Thus, although
Israeli domestic law conditions the power of Israeli courts to reduce
foreign sentences upon the existence of an agreement allowing it to do
so, 4 90 it is probable that the terms of Manning's extradition would
have permitted them to convert the judgment against him into one
491
under Israeli law.
Thus, had Manning been entitled to serve his sentence in Israel,
there would have been no guarantee that his U.S. sentence of life
without parole would have been honored by the Israeli courts.

486.
See id. art. 9(2) (stating that the sentencing state has the right to demand
that the administering state inform it, prior to transfer, as to whether it will continue
to enforce the sentencing state's judgment or convert it into a judgment under domestic
law).
487.
See Extradition Act (Amendment No. 6), § l(A)(1) (1999).
488.
See Van Proyen, supra note 51 (quoting Los Angeles Deputy District
Attorney Craig Hum as saying that "there's nothing we can do about [the terms of
extradition] because [Israel has] the bodies"). Arguably, the United States would not
be in a position to complain in the event that Israel chose to convert an American
sentence into a judgment under its own law, because this is also the practice of the
United States. When a U.S. citizen under foreign sentence is repatriated to the United
States under a prisoner transfer treaty, the United States Parole Commission converts
the judgment into one for the equivalent offense under U.S. law and calculates a
sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Asare v. United States, 2
F.3d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1993) (describing the Parole Commission regulations). On at
least some occasions, this results in reduction of the foreign sentence. See id. at 543
(noting that the Parole Commission had reduced the British sentence of a repatriated
U.S. citizen from six years to five).
489.
See Tugend, supra note 471.
490.
See Law Transferring Prisoners to Their Own Country, 1996 S.H. 1603, §
10(a)(1), as amended, 1999 S.H. 1720.
491.
Id. § 11 (stating that, upon review by an Israeli court, a foreign sentence is
converted into a judgment of the Israeli courts).
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Instead, his life sentence might well have been converted into a
judgment under Israeli law, which does not provide for life
imprisonment without parole. 492 This difference in law would
potentially have allowed him to go free after eighteen years despite
493
the fact that he had committed a terrorist murder.
Such an outcome would have created far greater friction between
the United States and Israel than actually occurred. Like Sheinbein,
Manning would have been an accused murderer who gained
considerable practical benefit from Israeli law despite having no real
connection to Israel. In addition, because at least one of the crimes of
which Manning was suspected was committed against a prominent
Arab-American activist, there would have been considerable outcry
from the Arab-American community much as there was from the
Latino community in the Sheinbein case. This outcry would be
especially so in light of the probable perception among ArabAmericans that he would receive preferential treatment in an Israeli
prison. 494 In other words, had the 1999 law been in effect at the time
Manning's extradition was requested, the Manning case would have
had the same potential for political explosion as Sheinbein's flight
from justice.
In fact, the Manning matter might have been deemed even more
egregious than the Sheinbein case. Unlike Sheinbein, who could
claim at least technical Israeli citizenship as of the date he murdered
Tello, Manning did not have even formal Israeli nationality when he
committed his crime. 495 Moreover, Manning's crime was not only a
gruesome murder but a terrorist act, and Israeli obstructionism
would have impaired the long-standing cooperation between Israel
and the United States in the fight against terrorism. 496 Had it
refused to extradite Manning, Israel might well have found it difficult
to obtain the extradition of suspected Arab terrorists who had fled to
497
the United States.
Thus, despite being enacted in reaction to the Sheinbein case,
the 1999 law poses the potential for equally explosive cases in the
future. The Manning case is not unique, as evidenced by the number
of U.S. citizens who have sought refuge from the law in Israel, and
the new law will make it even less so. An American Jew accused of

492.
See Gerald Mizejewski, Teen Will Plead Guilty in Israel, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1999, at Al (describing effect of life sentence under Israeli law).
493.
Id.
494.
See Timothy M. Phelps, Through PalestinianEyes: Arabs in TerritoriesSay
Israel Has Gone Beyond Occupation to Confiscation, NEWSDAY, June 6, 1988, at 4
(discussing perception among Arabs that Israelis who commit crimes against Arabs are

treated leniently in Israeli prisons).
495.
See Tugend, supra note 471.
496.
See Hedges, supra note 474, at Al (discussing the impact of the Manning
case on Israeli-U.S. cooperation against terrorism).
497.
Id.
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murder, or of another serious offense, would have little to lose and
much to gain by fleeing to Israel. The worst that will happen is that
he will be apprehended and extradited, leaving him no worse off than
when he began. Moreover, if he can remain in Israel long enough to
qualify as a "resident" prior to an extradition request being made,
then he could potentially be entitled to serve his sentence in Israel
and gain the benefit of the considerably more lenient Israeli parole
policy.
Moreover, it is precisely the most heinous offenders-those who
potentially face life imprisonment in the United States-who have
the greatest incentive to flee. An American Jew facing a short prison
term has much less reason to abandon his entire life in the United
States simply for the privilege of serving that sentence in Israel. On
the other hand, in cases where a life sentence is not mandatory under
Israeli law, the maximum sentence that may be imposed by an Israeli
court is twenty years. 4 98 Accordingly, an American Jew facing life
imprisonment for a drug offense-which does not carry a mandatory
life sentence in Israel-would stand to reduce his sentence
considerably if he remained a fugitive in Israel long enough to
establish residency. Simply put, the Israeli law as it now stands
would make Israel a potential haven, not merely for criminals, but for
the worst criminals.
This possibility has not gone unnoticed by Israeli legislators. On
occasions,
bills have been introduced into the Knesset that would
two
amend the Extradition Act to provide that Israeli citizens are
unconditionally extraditable unless they were both citizens and
The
residents at the time their offenses were committed. 499
bills
states
explanatory memorandum in support of the first of these
that:
The law that was passed permits a person who is not a citizen and not a
resident to flee to Israel after committing an offense, to obtain Israeli
citizenship, and even to claim Israeli residence if some time .

.

. has

elapsed between the day of his arrival in Israel and the day a request
for his extradition was submitted; in other words, a person who knows
that an investigation is being conducted against him in another
country, but who has not yet been arrested or indicted, flees to Israel
and is granted citizenship by relying on the Law of Return. He will also
claim that his sojourn in Israel is a permanent one, based on the
500
accepted criteria for determining a center of life.

The version of this bill introduced in the 1999-2000 session of the
Knesset, however, was not enacted, and the version introduced in the
following session likewise failed, albeit by a single vote.

498.

See Penal Code § 41, Special Vol. (1977).

499.
See Knesset Bill 2842/5760; Knesset Bill 2920/5761.
Cr. C. (B.S.) 2484/99, Attorney General v. Harosh, slip op. at 64 (citing
500.
Explanatory Note to Knesset Bill 2842/5760).
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C. Two ProposalsForReform
It is clear that, if another incident similar to the Manning case
takes place, the Israeli judicial system would potentially be subject to
continued manipulations by Jewish criminals from foreign countries.
In light of the goals of the Israeli extradition statute, the specific
abuses that are possible under the current law and the issues raised
by judicial decisions under both the 1978 and 1999 statutes, two
possibilities for reform suggest themselves.
The first is a modified version of the amendments suggested in
the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 sessions of the Knesset. This proposal
would shift the relevant date for determining citizenship and
residency from the date of the extradition request to that of the
offense, but include a specific definition of residency in the statute.
Such a definition could consist either of a bright-line test or a
multifactor subjective test. A bright-line test might exclude, for
example, any Israeli citizen who is not a citizen or permanent
resident of another country, or-like the Adoption of Children Lawrequire that the fugitive have lived in Israel for three of the five years
preceding the commission of the crime. 50 1 Alternatively, if a more
flexible standard is desirable to provide the courts with discretion in
extraordinary cases, then the statute could adopt a multifactor test
such as that proposed by Judge Ravid. 50 2 This standard might
include such factors as place of birth, place of domicile, length of
residence or absence, dual citizenship, and use of a foreign
5 03
passport.
Defining the term "resident" in the extradition statute would
provide guidance to the Israeli courts, would streamline the process of
adjudicating residency status, and would also alleviate the concerns
of MK Porat, at least somewhat, by reassuring Israelis that they
would not lose their residency status during relatively brief trips
abroad. In addition, MK Porat's other concern-that the lives of bona
fide Israeli immigrants might be disrupted by extradition requests
made many years after the offense at issue-could be addressed by
another amendment to the statute. Specifically, the provision of the
Extradition Act barring extradition after the expiration of the statute
of limitations could be amended to provide that the calculation of the
statute of limitations not include any tolling resulting from the
requested person's status as a fugitive. 50 4 In the context of Israeli-

501.
See id. at 36-37 (discussing the definition of residency under the Adoption
of Children Law).
502.
See supra notes 188.94 and accompanying text.
See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 6, at 343-44 (proposing a test that
503.
would include these factors).
504.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2001) (providing that no statute of limitations
provided in the Federal criminal code shall run while the defendant is a fugitive).
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U.S. extradition, this proposal would limit extradition for all but the
most serious federal offenses to a five-year period, thus minimizing
the possibility that a long-time Israeli resident would be subjected to
trial and imprisonment away from his family and country. At the
same time, because there is no statute of limitations for murder
under U.S. law, 50 5 there would be no possibility that the statute of
limitations would preclude the extradition of a fugitive wanted for
murder.
Alternatively, the Extradition Act could be amended to establish
two relevant dates rather than one. Specifically, this new law would
limit the protection of conditional extradition to persons who hold
Israeli citizenship at the time of the offense and are Israeli residents
on the date of the extradition request. This proposal might, in fact,
be the most effective method of preventing future manipulations of
On the one hand, people like
the Israeli extradition process.
Manning-who were not Israeli citizens at the time of the offensewould be unable to flee to Israel and establish residency at some
future date. On the other hand, people like Sheinbein-who were
technically Israeli citizens but had not established residency at the
time extradition was requested-would not be able to escape
extradition merely due to their formal Israeli nationality. Persons
with real connections to Israel, however, as demonstrated by their
pre-existing citizenship and continuing residency, would be eligible to
serve their sentences in Israel consistent with Israeli ideals and
international humanitarian norms.
This alternative would also harmonize Israeli extradition
procedure with domestic Israeli legislation concerning transfer of
penal sanctions. The 1996 statute providing for administration of
foreign sentences provides that, as a general rule, only those who
were Israeli citizens at the time of commission of the offense may be
transferred. 50 6 Although this condition could be waived in the
discretion of the Ministers of Justice and Internal Security,50 7 it is
nevertheless in conflict with the current extradition law, which
makes transfer mandatory in many cases even where the fugitive was
not a citizen when the crime was committed. 508 By amending the
Extradition Act to require citizenship on the date of the offense and
residency as of the date of the extradition request, Israeli extradition
law would be brought into consistency with the statute governing
prisoner transfers.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2001).
505.
See Law Transferring Prisoners to Their Own Country, 1996 S.H. 1630, §
506.
7(a)(1), as amended, 1999 S.H. 1720.
507.
Id. § 7(b).
508.
See supra note 476.
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D. An Afterthought. Is Citizenship Necessary?
A final consideration that may be addressed when reforming the
Israeli extradition statute is whether the protection of conditional
extradition should be extended to Israeli residents who are not
citizens. Just as Israel has a large population of nonresident citizens,
it is also home to a considerable number of noncitizen residents.
These include the Arabs of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, all
of whom were offered Israeli citizenship after the annexation of these
territories but few of whom have accepted. 50 9 Notwithstanding the
fact that they are not Israeli citizens, however, the great majority of
them were born in East Jerusalem or the Golan, reside there with
their families, and have never known any other home. 510
This fact means that the same humanitarian norms that
underlie the policy of repatriation of sentenced Israeli nationals-the
proximity of the prisoners' friends and families and rehabilitation
within their own cultures-are equally applicable to the Arabs of the
Golan and East Jerusalem. Indeed, as long ago as 1970, Theodor
Meron noted that the modern trend is to merge the concepts of
permanent or long-term residency and nationality.5 11 Specifically, he
noted that "[tjhere is a growing tendency to assimilate residence to
nationality" because "If]or a person who is really rooted in a [country
of which he is not a citizen], extradition may create problems similar
to those arising out of extradition of the nationals of the requested
State. 5 12 Given that Israel is home to more than 200,000 permanent
residents who are not citizens, this consideration is an especially
513
acute one for Israeli lawmakers.
In addition, it should be noted that, since 1978, noncitizen
residents of Israel who commit crimes in foreign countries are subject
to the active personality jurisdiction of the Israeli courts on the same
basis as citizens. 514 Thus, as Meron pointed out, because the
Offences Committed Abroad Act "makes residents of Israel subject to
the jurisdiction of Israeli courts with regard to ordinary offences
committed abroad ... should [they not be granted the same degree of]

509.
See Herling, supra note 337, at 71.
510.
Id.
511.
See Meron, supra note 26, at 78 n.7.
512.
Id.
513.
See David Bedeen, Down and Out in the Capital, JERUSALEM POST, Mar.
12, 1999, at 4 (stating that 200,000 East Jerusalem Arabs do not hold Israeli
citizenship).
514.
See Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Act, § 1(1), 32
L.S.I. (stating that "[t]he courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law an
Israeli national or resident of Israel who committed abroad an act which, had it been
committed in Israel, would be one of the offences included in the Schedule to the
Extradition Law").
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immunity from extradition, which has been granted to nationals?"5 15
Certainly, if a permanent resident's connection to Israel is sufficient
for active personality jurisdiction, then equitable considerations
would seem to dictate that it is also sufficient to require his
repatriation if sentenced abroad. As Israel increasingly expands its
conception of nationality and becomes a country of equal rights,5 16 the
consideration of ensuring that permanent residents do not face
extended incarceration away from their homes and families should be
an important one. It may thus be desirable to extend the protection
of conditional extradition to persons who are (1) either citizens or
permanent residents of Israel as of the commission of the offense for
which extradition is requested, and (2) residents of Israel as of the
date the extradition request is made.

V.

CONCLUSION

With the Extradition Act (Amendment No. 6) of 1999, Israel has
taken a step forward in its effort to balance its role as a sanctuary for
world Jewry with its obligation to cooperate with other nations
against crime. 517 In several critical respects, however, the 1999
amendment does not go far enough. In fact, the new law opens the
door to manipulation of the Israeli extradition process by persons
with no pre-existing Israeli citizenship or connection to Israel, as long
as they can remain in Israel long enough to qualify as residents
before an extradition request is made. As the example of the
Manning case demonstrates, this effect has the potential to lead to
political and law enforcement dilemmas every bit as damaging as the
Sheinbein case. While citizenship is no longer a bar to extradition
from Israel, the battleground has merely shifted to the issue of
residency; the possibility of manipulation of the extradition system by
foreign Jewish criminals still exists. As shown by cases such as those
of Berger, Harosh, and Engel, Jews who commit crimes abroad will

515.
Meron, supra note 78, at 224.
516.
See Shachar, supra note 23, at 248-52 (detailing the liberalization of the
Israeli concept of citizenship).
517.
It should also be noted that Israel and the United States are currently
discussing the possibility of a new extradition treaty under which all offenses
punishable by more than one year in prison under the law of each country, rather than
only the specific offenses listed in an annex to the treaty, would be extraditable. See
Dan Izenberg, Israel, US Begin Drafting New Extradition Treaty, JERUSALEM POST,
Sept. 15, 1999, at 5. If such a treaty is negotiated and ratified, it would also represent
a step forward in Israeli-U.S. extradition relations, as the list of offenses in the
appendix to the 1962 treaty do not include such frequently committed crimes as money
laundering. See United States v. Stroh, 2000 WL 1832956, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21223, at *15 (D. Conn. 2000) (noting that money laundering was not among the
extraditable offenses in the U.S.-Israeli treaty).
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continue to flee to Israel in the hope of either avoiding extradition
outright or attempting to be extradited on favorable terms.
Accordingly, further reform of the Israeli extradition law is
necessary in order to eliminate, or at least minimize, this possibility.
This goal could be accomplished either by requiring Israeli residency
as of the date of the offense but defining residency more clearly or by
continuing to require residency as of the date of the extradition
request but adding an additional requirement of citizenship on the
date the offense is committed. Either alternative would greatly
minimize the likelihood of abuse while providing maximum protection
to the legitimate interests of Israel and the United States.

